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Introduction
In the past few decades, the Supreme Court has decided a series of cases purporting to
clarify the respective roles of state and tribal courts in adjudicating disputes that involve Indian
litigants or arise in Indian country. As a result, a detailed set of rules now governs whether such
suits must be filed in a state or tribal forum. Since the foundational case of Williams v. Lee,1 for
example, it has been clear that a non-Indian plaintiff whose case concerns an Indian defendant
and an on-reservation transaction must file suit in tribal court. More recently, the Supreme Court
has effectively required that suits against a non-Indian arising out of events on privately owned
land generally must be brought in state court.
In other situations — for example, a lawsuit that involves non-Indians, but arguably
concerns core matters of tribal sovereignty — the proper choice of forum is more uncertain. It
may be a close question whether the suit may be brought in tribal court or must be filed in state
court, and the ultimate determination of which forum is proper may turn on seemingly
inconsequential facts: whether, say, the tribe or the state had responsibility for maintaining the
highway on which an accident occurred,2 or whether alleged spoilation of evidence occurred on
or off the campus of a tribal college.3
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evidence claim against a nonmember. Among the factors the Ninth Circuit considered was the degree of the suit’s
“connection to Indian lands,” which in turn required it to consider where the alleged destruction of notes from an
accident investigation report undertaken by Salish Kootenai College had occurred. The college was located on tribal
lands; thus, though the record was not clear about where the notes had in fact been destroyed, the court nonetheless
found that the college “had control over the notes” and that their loss or destruction thus involved “activities
conducted or controlled by a tribal entity on tribal lands.” Slip. op. at 119.
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The question of which court should hear cases implicating tribal interests thus often
requires a complex and technical answer. It is therefore all the more remarkable that courts
considering such cases have devoted almost no attention to the question of which law should
apply once a forum has been chosen.4 Instead, the Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that
the jurisdictional reach of tribal courts is identical to the scope of the tribe’s legitimate regulatory
interests5; similarly, state courts have often assumed that cases heard in state court will
necessarily be governed by state law.6 As a result, courts have tended to treat the issues of which
forum should hear a case and which law should be applied to it as if they were a single question
— simply assuming, without explicit consideration of the issue, that the forum in which the case
is brought will apply its own law.
This assumption, to be sure, does not entirely lack foundation. Under current
jurisdictional rules, cases involving Indians and arising on tribal land must generally be heard in
tribal court, while cases against nonmember defendants are usually restricted to state court. In
such situations, because the case likely arises in the forum and involves parties who have links to
it, most choice-of-law theories would dictate that the forum should apply its own law.7
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Further, there are historical and philosophical reasons why tribal law and tribal courts
should be closely tied together. Tribal courts are often an integral part of tribal life; indeed, the
federal government has supported tribal judicial systems as a primary means of fostering tribal
autonomy.8 There may also be practical difficulties in applying tribal law in nontribal forums. In
some tribes, tribal law is administered by elders who may not speak English9; in others, the
procedures tribal courts use to resolve disputes are inextricable from substantive law.10
Moreover, tribal and state courts have historically regarded each other with wariness and
suspicion. Many commentators reasonably fear that state courts will not give adequate
consideration to tribal interests, and that tribes and their members are generally better off if
disputes involving tribal matters are heard in tribal forums.11
Yet while these arguments have some persuasive force, they fail to add up to a conclusive
justification for keeping tribal law out of state court. To begin with, the arguments for restricting
state-court application of tribal law are built on a jurisdictional landscape that has changed. As
the Supreme Court has steadily limited tribal jurisdiction, it is no longer possible to assume that
tribal courts have power to hear all cases involving substantial tribal contacts. Further, even
where tribal courts have jurisdiction over individual claims, under certain circumstances state
courts are more likely to have jurisdiction over an entire case.12 It is likely, therefore, that many

8
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litigants make the reasonable choice to bring all possible claims in state court, rather than
splitting them between state and tribal court. As a result of these developments, many cases that
concern Indian litigants and arise in Indian country — cases that were once handled by tribal
courts — now must be brought in state court if they are to be heard at all.
In consequence, state courts are increasingly confronted with cases that involve
substantial tribal contacts, cases to which, under the choice-of-law principles followed by most
states, tribal law would ordinarily apply. Because of concerns about the propriety of applying
tribal law in state court, however, state-court judges may seek an alternative — such as
concluding that the court lacks jurisdiction over all or part of a case13 or manipulating choice-oflaw principles to the extent necessary to find that the case should be governed by state law.14
These results, while perhaps well-intentioned, often fail to serve the interests either of
tribes or of individual litigants. As it is, restrictions on tribal jurisdiction have made state court
the only available forum in many cases involving tribal matters. If state law rather than tribal law
is applied to such cases, the already-narrowing sphere of tribal influence will only shrink further.
By contrast, the application of tribal law in such circumstances has the potential to promote

280 states, where state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over tribal matters but tribal courts do not have
concomitant jurisdiction over cases traditionally heard by state courts.
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See, e.g., Risse, 585 N.W. at 879. Courts may also recast what is essentially a tribal-law issue as a jurisdictional
issue. See, e.g., Begay v. Roberts, 807 P.2d 1111 (Ariz. App. 1990) (holding that the lower court, while possessing
jurisdiction over the underlying case, had lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of garnishment against a Navajo
defendant’s wages because Navajo law did not provide for such a remedy).
14
See Harrison v. Boyd Mississippi, Inc., 700 So. 2d 247, 249 (Miss. 1997) (stating, without elaboration, that state
and tribal law on a given subject were identical and choice-of-law analysis hence unnecessary); Warm Springs Forest
Products Industries v. Employee Benefits Insurance Co., 300 Ore. 617 (1986) (finding that Oregon law applied to
contract entered into by a tribal corporation; Louis v. United States, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 (D.N.M. 1999)
(finding that, under federal statute, Congress likely intended state, rather than tribal, law to apply because of the
“difficulty in proving the existence and substance of any tribal law”).
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tribal autonomy and self-determination by providing a way in which tribal interests can be taken
into account even where tribal courts lack jurisdiction over a case.
State-court application of choice-of-law principles in cases with tribal contacts also has
the potential to benefit litigants. As current doctrine stands, the Supreme Court, acting under the
assumption that state and tribal forums will each apply their own law, has devoted considerable
attention to developing rules that determine whether a case involving tribal contacts should be
heard in tribal court or state court. Because the way in which these rules should apply to any
given case is often unclear, however, they can cause litigants considerable uncertainty. Further,
these judicially crafted rules can often lead to illogical and inefficient results — as when, for
example, they mandate that a given plaintiff’s claim must be heard in state court, while a
defendant’s counterclaim must be heard in tribal court.15
Many of these problems could be avoided if the problem of allocating cases between state
and tribal authority were regarded not merely as a forum-selection or jurisdictional problem, but
also as a choice-of-law one. Forum-selection rules tend to dictate an all-or-nothing solution.
Even if a case involves an equal mixture of state and tribal contacts, it ultimately must be brought
either in state court or in tribal court. By contrast, choice-of-law doctrine is far more flexible
and individualized. Unlike the decision whether to allow a claim to be heard in a particular
forum, which generally must be made at the outset, choice-of-law decisions can be made on a
case-by-case basis and in conjunction with a decision on the merits. A choice-of-law approach is
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Under Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), this could be the
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a counterclaim; it would also be the case if a tribe member wished to counterclaim against a nonmember who sued
her in state court.
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thus both more efficient from a litigant’s point of view and more suited to a balanced
accommodation of state and tribal interests.
Finally, there is little evidence that encouraging state courts to apply choice-of-law
principles in the tribal context would create the practical difficulties that commentators have
sometimes feared. Although the problems entailed in state-court interpretation of tribal law are
real, they are also easy to overstate. It is true that the law of certain tribes may be difficult for
outsiders to understand or apply. Many other tribes, however, rely to some degree on principles
of Anglo-American jurisprudence familiar to state courts.16 Frequently, tribal codes look to state
law as a model, and tribal courts may borrow state law where no tribal regulation exists.17 While
the tribal law applied in these courts may not mirror exactly the law of any given state, the
differences that exist are likely to be the sort of routine conflicts that state courts are accustomed
to negotiating: whether to apply a tribal ordinance allowing for unlimited punitive damages
where state law imposes a cap,18 or whether or not a creditor must make use of judicial process
before repossessing property.19 In cases such as these, where there is little possibility for
misunderstanding, it is likely that many tribes will accept and, in fact, welcome the broader
application of their laws. Further, in cases where tribes do not wish to have their law applied by
outsiders, choice-of-law theory is flexible enough to take such preferences into account, thus
minimizing the risk of undermining tribal authority.
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This article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews in turn the two principal strands of
Indian law doctrine, as reflected in Supreme Court cases: first, cases that attempt to foster tribal
autonomy; second, cases that impose strict limits on tribal regulatory and adjudicative power
over nonmembers. Part I then outlines two serious problems with the current state of the law:
first, that the complex and highly fact-bound set of jurisdictional rules the Court has developed
leads to uncertainty and inefficiency in choice of forum; and second, that the Court’s decisions
have given insufficient weight to tribal interests.
Part II examines the possibility that wider application of tribal law in state court could
help to address these concerns by reducing the jurisdictional friction between states and tribes
and permitting tribal interests to be taken into account more fully. Part II first sets forth the
argument that, under prevailing choice-of-law principles, tribal law should be applied more
broadly in state court than it generally has been. It explores the way in which choice-of-law
concepts can be adapted to the distinctive features of tribal sovereignty, and discusses why such
an approach would have advantages over the current one.
Part III discusses potential objections to the application of tribal law by state courts: first,
that it might raise due process concerns; second, that it might be preempted by federal Indian
law; third, that application of tribal law will inevitably undermine tribal autonomy. Rejecting
these arguments, this article ultimately concludes that state-court application of tribal law will
help state courts to handle cases with tribal contacts in a way that is fairer and more
straightforward — an outcome that will ultimately work to the advantage of both litigants and
tribes.
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I.

A Thicket of Rules: Tribal-State Case Allocation Under Current Law
While a detailed set of rules governs the allocation of cases between state and tribe

courts, these rules are not the product of a comprehensive body of doctrine or statutory scheme.
Instead, most of the principles that determine whether a case should be brought in state or tribal
court are the result of judicially formulated, fact-specific solutions to the problems presented by
individual cases. Taken as a whole, these forum-selection rules often, perhaps unsurprisingly,
lead to illogical or unexpected results.
The seeming chaos of the Supreme Court’s case law is in part the product of the two
central principles by which the Court has been guided, which have often pointed in conflicting
directions. On the one hand, the Court has sought to protect tribes’ right to govern
autonomously, free from state interference. As a result, the Court has sought to ensure that tribal
courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over the cases that seem most likely to implicate core tribal
interests, and to protect tribal courts, like other instruments of tribal self-governance, from
sometimes-hostile state policies.20 Further, the Court has often resisted Congress’s efforts to
promote assimilation at the expense of tribal authority — through, for example, the Court’s
decision to adopt a narrow construction of P.L. 280, a federal statute that gives a handful of states
concurrent jurisdiction over tribal disputes.21
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In the nineteenth century and parts of the twentieth, the Court often acted as a lone — if inconsistent and
inescapably colonialist — champion of tribal interests that have often been encroached upon by state governments
and ignored in national electoral politics. For an extensive discussion of the Court’s present and historical role, see
Philip Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in American Public Law, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 431 (2005). More
recently, Congress and the Bureau of Indian affairs have become more sympathetic to the goal of tribal autonomy,
and the Supreme Court’s pro-sovereignty decisions have had the effect of furthering legislative and executive policy
rather than hindering it.
21
See Bryan v. Itasca Country, 426 U.S. 373, 388 (1976) (discussed more fully infra at Part IIIB).

8

At the same time that it has sought to protect tribal institutions, however, the Court has
also at times looked at those institutions with suspicion. Tribal governing bodies and tribal
courts are not subject to the constraints of the Constitution,22 and perhaps in consequence, the
Court has been reluctant to allow them to assert authority over those who are not voting,
participating members of the tribe. While insisting that tribes are more than “voluntary
organizations,”23 the Court has nonetheless sharply constrained tribes’ ability to govern those
who have not taken affirmative steps to associate themselves with the tribe.24 Under current law,
therefore, nonmembers who stand in no special relationship to tribes generally will not be subject
to tribal law and cannot be haled into tribal court against their will.
As it has sought to promote these two often-conflicting goals, the Court has mostly
sought to regulate the allocation of cases involving tribal contacts through one primary method:
by assigning a case either to state court, where state law will presumptively apply, or to tribal
court, where it will likely be governed by tribal law. Further, the Court has developed such
procedural mandates on a case-by-case basis, considering only rarely — if at all — how they
interact as a whole. Therefore, like the contradictory aims they are designed to serve, the caseallocation rules the Court has developed often pull in two directions. For example, while the
Supreme Court has, on the one hand, emphasized the centrality of tribal courts to tribal
sovereignty, it has also severely undermined the power of tribal courts to hear disputes that have
a significant effect on tribes’ well-being. Moreover, the current rules of forum allocation protect
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See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (“The tribes are, to be sure, a good deal more than private voluntary
organizations, and are aptly described as unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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See Canby, supra note 17, at 112 (noting Supreme Court’s recent focus on tribe membership).
23

9

certain litigants’ interests while ignoring others. Indian defendants, for example, are shielded
from being sued in a state forum, while Indian plaintiffs are severely hampered in their ability to
sue nontribal defendants in a forum of their choice.
This section considers these developments and their effects. It starts by setting forth a
brief history of tribal sovereignty and the relationship between tribal and state courts. It then
considers in turn the two main approaches to tribal sovereignty the Supreme Court has pursued
and the concrete procedural rules those policies have created. Throughout, this section seeks to
demonstrate the problems inherent in the single, problematic method — assigning jurisdiction
over particular types of cases to either a state or a tribal forum — by which the Court has defined
and enforced the respective limits on state and tribal sovereignty.
A.

Historical Background: Tribal Autonomy and Geographic Fragmentation
For a variety of historical reasons, unique problems exist in allocating cases between state

and tribal courts and in translating choice-of-law principles to the tribal context. Because of
various efforts by the federal government to transfer tribal trust land to private owners, the
geographical reach of a tribe’s political control is often uncertain. Similarly, the degree of
sovereignty tribes have been thought to possess in relationship to states and the federal
government has shifted over time, and remains unclear today. This section sketches forth some
of the historical background necessary for an understanding of the current state of the law.
Only fairly recently have procedures for allocating cases between state and tribal court
have become necessary. For most of the nation’s history, tribal judicial systems, where they
existed at all, functioned with almost complete autonomy. Until the end of the nineteenth
century, tribes performed the task of keeping order on their lands themselves, using both formal
10

and informal judicial processes,25 and state and federal courts were frequently willing to
recognize and enforce the judgments of tribal courts.26 (By contrast, only a minority of states
today extends automatic or near-automatic recognition to tribal judgments.27) While federal
courts sometimes intervened to protect tribes against hostile state governments,28 tribes and states
had little formal interaction. In fact, only in 1924 did Indians living on a reservation become
recognized as citizens of the surrounding state as well as members of a tribe.29
By the late nineteenth century, however, the federal government had become
increasingly interested in weakening the power of tribes and assimilating Indians into AngloAmerican culture.30 To handle tribal civil controversies, the federal government began to
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See Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction Over Federal Enforcement of
Federal Law, 80 Marq. L. Rev. 531, 547-48 (1997); Zuni, supra note 9 (arguing that prior to the end of treatymaking with tribes in 1871, “the federal policy was one of respect for tribal self-government and traditional forms of
tribal justice.”).
26
In United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 102 (1855), the Supreme Court held a tribal court
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the definition of a “territory” under the relevant federal probate statute. See also Stacy L. Leeds, CrossJurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. Rev. 311, 320
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judgments was required by the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause or its implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1738, which specifically encompasses “territories,” in practice many lower courts automatically gave full faith and
credit to tribal judgments).
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The Role, If Any, for the Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Federal, State, and Tribal Money
Judgments, 35 Tulsa L. J. 1, 16-17 (1999), the majority of state courts today have concluded that the constitutional
Full Faith and Credit clause and its implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, do not command state-court
recognitions of tribal judgments. While few states, such as New Mexico, take the opposite view, finding that tribal
lands are included in the statute’s reference to “territories,” see Leeds, supra note 26, at 332, most state courts grant
a measure of deference to tribal judgments that falls well short of the automatic recognition they must accord sisterstate judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See Canby, supra note 17, at 213.
28
See, most famously, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
29
Canby, supra note 17, at 23. In 1924, the Indian Citizenship Act granted Indians federal citizenship; through the
Fourteenth Amendment, Indians thus also became citizens of the state in which they resided. See id.
30
The practice of allowing tribes autonomy in handling their legal affairs became particularly controversial following
a well-publicized 1883 case in which the Court held that no jurisdiction existed in federal court over a murder of one
Indian by another. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). In response to public perception that tribal justice
was inadequate in cases of violent crime, see Canby, supra note 17, at 19-20, Congress passed the Major Crimes
Act, which granted federal courts jurisdiction over a variety of serious crimes in Indian country, including those in
which the perpetrator and victim were both Indians. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
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establish Courts of Indian Affairs, which applied federal common law rather than tribal law.31 In
addition, in 1887 Congress enacted the General Allotment Act,32 which authorized grants of
reservation land to individual Indians, to be held in trust by the federal government for a period
of time before passing into private ownership.33 Among other significant provisions, the Act
allowed any remaining reservation land to be made available to non-Indians; in addition, it made
Indian allottees subject to state law.34
While allotment was applied to different reservations to varying degrees, the substantial
majority of reservation land was ultimately allotted, and much of the allotted land was ultimately
sold to non-Indians.35 By creating a checkerboard pattern of ownership, the effects of allotment
added an element of uncertainty to tribal jurisdiction and strengthened the arguments of those
who believed that state courts and state law should have a role in Indian country.36 As will be
subsequently discussed, the checkerboard pattern thus created resulted in lasting uncertainty
about the territorial reach of any given tribe’s power.
In recognition of the difficulties allotment had caused, federal policy in the 1930s
shifted in a radically different direction. Federal officials began to recognize the virtues of tribal
autonomy — not just as a default state of affairs, but as a goal towards which to strive. The
Indian Reorganization Act of 193437 returned some unallotted land to tribal control and provided
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Canby, supra note 17, at 19.
See 24 Stat. 388.
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Canby, supra note 17, at 21.
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Id.
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Id. at 22 (noting that Indian-held land declined from 138 to 48 million acres from 1887 to 1984).
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See Phillip Allen White, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, 22 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 65, 75 n.31 (1997) (“[A]s nonIndians moved onto reservations, so too did state law.”)
37
25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq.
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a structure by which tribes could register constitutions with the federal government.38 Many
tribes formalized their structures of governance in written constitutions and re-established their
defunct tribal courts.39 Nonetheless, because allotment had eroded the geographical integrity of
reservations, the revived tribal courts were thus unable to function with anything like the
autonomy their nineteenth-century counterparts had enjoyed.40
By the 1950s, assimilationism had come back into vogue, this time in the form of the
policy known as “termination,” which was designed to do away with tribes as political entities
and with reservations as distinctively Indian land.41 In many cases, tribes were dissolved, tribal
lands were sold, and individual Indians were encouraged to relocate to non-Indian areas.42
Further, in contrast to the program of allotment, states — as opposed to the federal government
— became a primary instrument of weakening tribal political power. Thus, as part of the
assimilation process, Congress granted certain states broad jurisdiction to decide disputes in
Indian country.43 Shortly thereafter, Congress provided a more comprehensive grant of
jurisdiction in the form of Public Law 280,44 which gave five states (California, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington, with a sixth jurisdiction — the then-territory of Alaska —
added in 1958) extensive criminal and civil adjudicatory authority over reservations.45
38

See Canby, supra note 17, at 24.
See Leeds, supra note 26, at 324; Zuni, supra note 9.
40
See Canby, supra note 17, at 24 (describing the post-allotment era as “a marked change from [earlier times], when
reservations were fairly homogeneous territories with clearly defined boundaries and where most non-Indians were
present expressly to engage in some form of intercourse with the Indian inhabitants”).
41
Id. at 25-26.
42
Id. at 26-27.
43
See Robert B. Porter, The Jurisdictional Relationship Between the Iroquois and New York State, 27 Harv. J. on
Legis. 497, 540-41.
44
See Canby, supra note 17, at 219. As discussed infra at Part IIIB, the Court in Bryan, 426 U.S. at 373, gave the
civil-jurisdiction provisions of P.L. 280 a fairly restrictive interpretation.
45
Id. A few Indian reservations within the affected states were exempted from P.L. 280’s coverage either in the
original statute or through later-added retrocession provisions.
39
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Like allotment, termination was ultimately recognized as a failure — a policy that
disrupted the fabric of tribal life while failing to integrate tribe members, either economically or
culturally, into non-Indian society.46 Starting in the Nixon administration, the federal
government began to shift back toward autonomy-promoting policies — an ideology that has
remained more or less in place to the present day.47
At various points, therefore, the federal government has embraced two essentially
opposite goals48 — assimilationism and tribal autonomy — and tribal institutions have been
influenced not only by these conflicting policies but by the way in which the federal government
has swung back and forth between them. In periods when the federal government adopted proautonomy policies, it did so in large part by encouraging the development of tribal law and tribal
institutions, including tribal courts. By contrast, the federal government has primarily
implemented assimilationist policies in two ways — first, by disrupting the geographical integrity
of Indian reservations, and second, by increasing the role of states in Indian life. Thus these two
sets of policies, designed to achieve opposite ends, have resulted in an unintended hybrid:
reservations that often have strong tribal institutions, including courts, but that are geographically
fragmented,49 and that share regulatory power, sometimes uneasily, with states.50
46

See Canby, supra note 17, at 29.
Id.
48
The approach of the political branches can be compared to that of the Supreme Court, which — as the following
section argues — has vacillated over time between strong concern for the rights of tribes on the one hand and fears
about abuses of tribal power on the other. The Court and the political branches have not, however, always embraced
the same trends at the same time; for example, the Court decided Williams v. Lee, a case that strongly embraces tribal
autonomy, at a time when Congress was still flirting with assimilationism.
49
There are, of course, a multitude of reasons why the identity of tribes may not be as strongly grounded in
geography as that of other political entities may be. Most obviously, tribes may have lost, through treaties or forced
relocations, land they originally inhabited land or that has political or cultural significance to the tribe.
Congressional policies of allotment and termination, however, have also played a significant role. See Canby, supra
note 17, at 22-25.
50
See Canby, supra note 17, at 270-76 (discussing extent of state regulatory power in Indian country).
47
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Thus, as a result of various federal policies, tribes have some common characteristics of
other sovereigns, including, for example, courts, political institutions, and sovereign immunity,51
while lacking others, such as political authority within their borders that operates irrespective of
the ownership of individual parcels of land. As the following section argues, this particular set of
characteristics has shaped the way in which the Supreme Court has developed what I will call,
for lack of a better term, its jurisprudence of case allocation.52 In other words, the Court has at
various times treated tribes like sovereigns; it has sought to protect tribal courts from state
interference and, in particular, to prevent states from asserting jurisdiction over sensitive tribal
issues.53 At the same time, the Court has also refused to assume that tribes have all the usual
characteristics of sovereigns; it has, for example, held that tribal courts are not courts of general
jurisdiction54 and that — in striking contrast to state courts — their jurisdiction is only as broad
as the tribe’s underlying regulatory power.55
While these two judicial goals in themselves often point in different directions, the
problem is compounded by the fact that reservations themselves are often fragmented,
encompassing at least three different categories of land: land owned by tribe members, land
owned by non-Indians or Indians who are not members of the tribe, and tribal trust land.56
Because these various types of land are subject to varying degrees of tribal influence and control,
51

See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (reaffirming the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity).
52
This term is designed to encompass a few separate concepts: the question of whether a case implicating Indian
affairs should be brought in state or tribal court; the question of whether state or tribal law should apply to such a
case; and the question of which decisionmaker should determine the preceding two issues.
53
See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that non-Indians cannot sue Indians in state court for disputes
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there is no obvious territorial marker of tribal authority. Further, pockets of land outside Indian
reservations, including “all dependent communities within the borders of the United States” and
all allotted land with existing Indian title, also qualify as “Indian country” by federal statute.57
Therefore, though the geographical boundaries of the reservation may be clear, the geographical
reach of the tribe’s power is far less so.58 Thus, a largely unintended byproduct of the aborted
assimilationist program has been to increase the gray areas in which both states and tribes can
plausibly claim jurisdiction.
B.

Conflicting Rules: The Supreme Court and Case Allocation
The second part of this section considers in turn the two faces of the Supreme Court in

Indian jurisdiction cases: first as a protector of tribal autonomy, and second as an enforcer of
limits on tribal power. It argues that the Court, in both roles, has used rules establishing which
forum can or must hear a case as its primary means of implementing policy.
1. From Williams to Wold: Tribal Autonomy as Procedural Rule
Over the past few decades, the Supreme Court has, in a few landmark cases, announced a
set of procedural rules designed to protect tribal autonomy. This section considers those key
cases and the ways in which they reflect differing views about the role of state courts in tribal
affairs.
a. Williams v. Lee
In the 1958 case of Williams v. Lee,59 the Court established a jurisdictional principle that
ensured that Indian defendants would be not be required to defend themselves against non56

Canby, supra note 17, at 114.
18 U.S.C. § 1151; see also Canby, supra note 17, at 114.
58
See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Nation, 492 US 408 (1989) (discussed infra at note 201).
57
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Indians in possibly hostile state courts. Reversing the Arizona state courts, the Supreme Court
held that a non-Indian proprietor of a general store on the Navajo Indian Reservation who wished
to sue a Navajo couple for unpaid debts was obliged to do so in tribal court. Further, the Court
established a famous test for determining whether a given state assertion of jurisdiction over
Indian country was legitimate: “whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”60
Williams v. Lee had a powerful philosophical influence on lower courts.61 The Court’s
succinct definition of tribal sovereignty as “the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them” is perhaps the most widely quoted phrase in the Indian-law canon.62
Beyond Williams’s strong defense of tribal autonomy, however, the case can also be interpreted
as setting forth two subsidiary principles.
First, although Williams’s holding was framed in terms of broad principles of tribal
sovereignty, Williams’s most immediate effect was to establish a fairly rigid procedural rule: if a
non-Indian sues an Indian in a case arising in Indian country, that case must be heard in tribal
court. 63 While, as the Court recognized, such a rule provides a great deal of protection to tribes
and tribal defendants, it also presents certain practical difficulties. First, the rule assumes that the
identities of plaintiff and defendant remain stable in any given case. Often, however, this will
not be so. In certain cases — such as a complex contract dispute — it may not initially be clear
59

358 U.S. 217 (1958).
Id. at 219-20.
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Indian law.” See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 595.
63
As Reynolds notes, “[p]erhaps because of the ambiguous analytical basis of the holdings, state courts have seized
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sovereignty or federal preemption to determine the limits of state court adjudicatory power.” Reynolds, supra note 6,
60
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who is liable to whom, and both parties may believe themselves to be aggrieved. In such cases,
which party becomes the plaintiff and which the defendant may be determined simply by who
files suit first. Similarly, someone who is sued and then brings a counterclaim may be both
plaintiff and defendant in the same action.64 Moreover, the rule of Williams assumes that a tribal
court will always be available to hear a dispute. This is not always the case, not only because
some tribes are too small or poor to maintain judicial systems,65 but because a tribal court is
under no obligation to exercise the full extent of its jurisdiction; many tribes, for example, limit
access to their courts to tribe members.66
A more substantive effect of Williams, however, may have been to foster the perception
that, in order for tribes to enjoy the right to “be ruled by” their own laws, such laws must be
enforced in tribal court. Of course, on the facts of Williams itself, few would disagree that
application of Arizona law to the tribal defendants — presumably what would have occurred had
the plaintiffs been allowed to proceed in state court — would have undermined Navajo self-rule
by substituting another sovereign’s laws as the decisional law in the case. The Court, however,
went further, suggesting that the mere “exercise of state jurisdiction” would “undermine the
authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs.”67 Williams therefore firmly established
the idea that tribal adjudication, not application of tribal law, was the primary device by which
tribal sovereignty could be furthered.

at 546-47.
64
See Wold v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 476 U.S. 877, 891 (1986) (recognizing
problem created by counterclaim asserted against Indian who had sued non-Indian in North Dakota court).
65
While some tribes have well-developed judicial systems, others still rely on “very informal single-judge courts
operated on a part-time basis without supplementary services.” See Canby, supra note 17, at 64.
66
Reynolds, supra note 6, at 577 (noting that many tribes follow model ordinance originally provided by the
Department of the Interior, which did not provide for jurisdiction over nonmembers).
67
358 U.S. at 223.
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This principle carried the potential for some unfairness to individuals, since a strict
application of Williams could have the effect of leaving certain plaintiffs without a remedy in
situations where tribal court was unavailable. A more subtle and more important effect of
Williams, however, may have been to encourage state courts to think of tribal autonomy only in
terms of tribal adjudication. In other words, once a state court has satisfied itself that an assertion
of jurisdiction over a given case would comport with Williams’s requirements — either because
the defendant is non-Indian or because substantial parts of the transaction occurred off the
reservation — it may conclude that it has done all that is necessary to respect tribes’ rights to
“make their own laws and be ruled by them.”68
None of this is to slight the importance of Williams, which remains a landmark case for
tribal autonomy and am important guarantee of tribal rights. Yet while the principles underlying
Williams remain vital, the specific jurisdictional rule the Court chose to implement those
principles is perhaps in some ways outdated, and its rigidity may constrain state courts in ways
that are not always beneficial to tribes.
b. Fostering Tribal-Court Control Over Tribal Disputes: Fisher v. District Court
In Fisher v. District Court,69 a case involving a tribe member’s efforts to adopt a child
who was also the subject of a tribal custody dispute, the Court reinforced and extended the
central principle of Williams by suggesting that state courts lack jurisdiction against all Indian
defendants, even in situations where the plaintiff is also Indian. Noting that state jurisdiction
68

As Reynolds notes, state courts often give Williams its narrowest possible scope, “refus[ing] to adjudicate disputes
involving Indians or reservation affairs only if the defendant is an Indian and if the transaction involves no
substantial off-reservation contacts. That is, state courts generally assert jurisdiction over suits brought against a nonIndian defendant even if the transaction arose in Indian country; similarly, many cases hold that state court
adjudication is proper in lawsuits filed against an Indian defendant if the facts reveal substantial off-reservation
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over a dispute among Indians was required to meet “at least” the standard set by Williams,70 the
Court found that to allow the state to assume jurisdiction in this case would be to “subject a
dispute arising on the reservation among reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they
have established for themselves.”71
From the standpoint of promoting tribal autonomy and avoiding interference with tribal
courts’ decision-making powers, the Court’s decision was abundantly justified. Many
commentators had urged that states not be permitted to interfere with Indian custody disputes
among Indians on the grounds that they were core matters of tribal identity.72 Further, in this
case, the risk that the tribal court’s authority would be undermined by a conflicting state
adjudication was a real one: The plaintiff had turned to Montana court while a related custody
proceeding was pending in tribal court, and in defiance of the tribal court’s holding that it had
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.73
Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion appeared to rest in part on the idea that, even had these
additional factors not been present, state-court jurisdiction would undermine the “right of the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe to govern itself independently of state law.”74 As in Williams,
therefore, the Court apparently assumed both that state courts would apply state law and that
state-court adjudication of suits against Indian defendants would inevitably undermine tribal
contacts.” See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 547.
69
424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976).
70
Id. at 386.
71
Id. at 387-88.
72
Indeed, just two years after Fisher was decided, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act, which grants tribes
exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters unless they are in a P.L. 280 state.
73
In an unusual procedure, the Montana trial court certified the question of its jurisdiction to the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe, which found that the tribe possessed exclusive jurisdiction. 424 U.S. at 384. Although the Montana trial
court then dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, the Montana Supreme Court overturned this ruling. Id. at 38485.
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authority.
Further, going beyond Williams, the Court indicated that the need to allow tribal courts to
decide tribal disputes should override the preferences of individual Indians. Responding to the
argument that a bar on state-court access would be unfair to Indian plaintiffs, the Fisher Court
found that “even if a jurisdictional holding occasionally results in denying an Indian plaintiff a
forum to which a non-Indian has access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is justified
because it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the
congressional policy of Indian self-government.”75 Thus, the Court suggested, the decision to
deny individual Indian plaintiffs access to state court was in the best interests of Indians as a
whole. The Court’s reasoning is particularly surprising given the existence of a seemingly far
more plausible (and less paternalistic) justification for the result in Fisher — that concern for the
rights of tribal defendants required that the claims asserted against them be decided in tribal
forums and/or according to tribal law.76
Thus, Fisher in essence replicated some of the problems created by Williams — adopting
a wholesale procedural rule as a way of handling complex issues of tribal autonomy, and
articulating an unnecessarily constricted view of the scope of tribal interests. In particular, the
Court failed to differentiate between the interests of individual Indian litigants from the interest
of the tribe as a whole — and, in consequence, failed to explain convincingly why it had chosen
to favor the latter at the possible expense of the former. Therefore, although — as had been the
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case in Williams — the result in Fisher was entirely sensible and justified, Fisher’s simple
hands-off rule may have been at once too rigid and too narrow a way of understanding how state
courts should take into account tribal interests in litigation that might come before them.
c.

Ensuring Access: The Wold Cases

Where Williams addressed the consequences of a suit by a non-Indian against an Indian,
Wold I77 and Wold II78 concerned the opposite situation: the degree to which state courts were
obliged to provide access to Indian plaintiffs suing non-Indian defendants.79 In the Wold cases,
the Supreme Court considered whether North Dakota could lawfully place conditions on tribes’
access to courts, and concluded that it could not.
The Wold cases arose out of the following situation. North Dakota courts had historically
asserted jurisdiction over Indian country in cases not involving Indian land interests. After P.L.
280 was passed, North Dakota courts interpreted the law as confirming jurisdiction they already
possessed. In 1963, in accordance with amendments to P.L. 280 permitting new assumptions of
jurisdiction with tribal consent, the North Dakota legislature enacted a new statute, Chapter 2719, which provided that “jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be extended over all civil
claims for relief which arise on an Indian reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens in a
manner provided by this chapter.”80 Chapter 27-19 further provided that, upon such acceptance,
“civil laws of this state that are of general application to private property” would also apply in
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Indian country.81
Subsequently, the Three Affiliated Tribes sued Wold Engineering in state court for
negligence and breach of contract in connection with Wold’s construction of a water supply
system on the reservation.82 Wold counterclaimed for the Three Tribes’ alleged failure to make
payments. The North Dakota courts dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction, holding that
when Chapter 27-19 instituted a tribal consent requirement, it disclaimed all jurisdiction the state
had previously possessed.83
The Supreme Court reversed, in a decision that has been taken to hold that that state
courts must remain open for Indians who wish to bring suit there.84 The Court found that
Chapter 27-19 was preempted insofar as it attempted to “disclaim pre-existing jurisdiction over
suits by tribal plaintiffs against non-Indians for which there is no other forum” if tribes did not
consent to the state’s conditions.85 In so holding, the court relied on the “important backdrop”
provided by “considerations of tribal sovereignty, and the federal interests in promoting Indian
self-governance and autonomy,”86 finding that “the state interest, as presently implemented, is
unduly burdensome on the federal and tribal interests.”87
The Court drew a sharp contrast between this situation and that of Williams, finding that
“tribal self-government is not impeded when a State allows an Indian to enter its courts on equal
terms with other persons to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian
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country.”88 Indeed, as the Court pointed out, Indians would often have no judicial recourse in the
absence of such state jurisdiction, since even if plaintiffs were able to secure tribal judgments
they would be unable to enforce them in state court.89
This time, instead of emphasizing the importance of a tribal forum, the Court instead
focused on the displacement of tribal law. The Court expressed skepticism about Chapter 2719’s requirement that, in order to gain access to state courts, tribes would have to agree that state
law would generally apply to claims by Indian plaintiffs. This possibility, the Court found, was a
“potentially severe intrusion on the Indians’ ability to govern themselves according to their own
laws” that “simply [could not] be reconciled with Congress’ jealous regard for Indian selfgovernance.”90
Wold I and II thus cast doubt on Williams’s implicit equation of tribal-court jurisdiction
with tribal independence. Instead, the Wold cases suggest that adequate respect for tribal
sovereignty hinges not on whether a case is heard in a state or tribal forum, but whether it is
decided according to state or tribal law.91 Indeed, through its rejection of the state-lawmandating condition North Dakota attempted to impose, Wold II can even be read to imply that
under some circumstances, state courts might be required to choose tribal law.
At the same time, however, the Wold cases fail to explore the implications of some of
these more sweeping statements, neglecting to consider the relationship between the regime they
establish and the policy in favor of tribal adjudication that Williams reflects. Moreover, as is also
88
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arguably the case with Williams, the ringing endorsements of tribal autonomy found in Wold I
and II can essentially be boiled down to a procedural rule: in this case, that Indian plaintiffs must
be allowed to sue non-Indian defendants in state court.
As well as being disappointingly limited, this holding is also problematic, particularly
when set against Williams. Under the everything-not-compulsory-is-forbidden regime that
Williams and Wold I and II set up, state courts may not assert jurisdiction in situations where the
defendant is an Indian and the plaintiff non-Indian; in the reverse situation, however, they may
not decline jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, this rule places a strong emphasis on the form of a
lawsuit, creating a conundrum for courts — and for litigants — in cases in which both parties
have asserted claims against the other. The Wold II Court recognized this issue but set it aside,
declining to address the problem of how counterclaims should be handled.92
Williams, Fisher, and the Wold cases show how the Court’s philosophy of how cases
should be allocated between state and tribal court may be fraught with tensions and
contradictions even when the Court is acting in service of a single goal — protecting tribal
sovereignty. Further, these cases illustrate how the Court has focused exclusively on creating
rules about the forum in which a case may or must be brought as a way of achieving that goal,
while giving inadequate attention to the overall procedural regime its decisions create. Finally,
even as its decisions, particularly Wold II, suggest that choice of law is a significant part of the
picture, the Court has not framed the holdings of its cases in choice-of-law terms, and it has
provided little guidance or analysis to courts deciding which law to apply.
91
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The Court’s silence is particularly striking given that application of tribal law under
choice-of-law principles would represent one way to reconcile Williams and Fisher with Wold I
and II. In both Williams and Wold, a principal threat to tribal sovereignty was that a tribe, or one
of its members, would be confronted with the possibility of having state law applied to tribal
disputes — in Williams because the state court would likely have applied Arizona law to an onreservation transaction, in Wold I and II because North Dakota attempted to condition tribal
access to state courts on the promise to accept the application of state law. By focusing
exclusively on the court in which a dispute was to be heard rather than the law to be applied,
however, the Court obscured these differences.
2. The Road to Hicks: Expanding state courts’ role in adjudicating tribal disputes
The Court’s cases affirming tribal sovereignty represent only one facet of the Court’s
case-allocation regime. The following section explores the Court’s decisions that serve a
distinct, and sometimes opposite goal — shielding tribal nonmembers from unfamiliar tribal
courts — and looks at the further procedural tangles they have created.
In the past two decades, the Court has substantially narrowed tribes’ ability to regulate the
conduct of nonmembers and impeded the ability of tribal courts to decide cases involving
nonmembers. Under current law, a person over whom the tribe lacks regulatory jurisdiction — a
category that includes almost all nonmembers — cannot be haled into tribal court.93

subject of some discussion in this case”).
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The Court has not applied this reasoning to state courts and state law; that is, while the Court has sometimes
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This principle, an unusual approach to adjudicative jurisdiction,94 has brought into
existence another complex jurisdictional inquiry in cases involving tribal interests. In contrast to
the several independent rules that govern whether state courts may (or must) hear suits involving
tribal contacts, the existence of tribal-court jurisdiction hinges on a test initially set forth in a
single case, Montana. Nonetheless, the question of tribal jurisdiction is far from straightforward
because the Montana test is a complicated one to apply. Thus, unlike the limits on state-court
adjudication of tribal cases — the application of which is relatively simple — the boundaries of
tribal courts’ jurisdiction are often uncertain.
As the preceding section has described, state-court jurisdiction is based on litigant
identity. The existence of jurisdiction, or the lack thereof, is clear once it has been established
whether the plaintiff and the defendant are Indian or non-Indian.95 Where tribal-court
jurisdiction is concerned, however, identity is only one piece of the puzzle. Tribal courts
normally have jurisdiction over members of the tribe for on-reservation conduct,96 but the
existence of jurisdiction over other defendants depends not only on membership status but a host
would have expressly said so”).
94
Consider, for example, the tenuousness of the connection that may justify haling an out-of-state defendant into
another state’s courts under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l
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of other factors: whether relevant events took place within reservation borders,97 the ownership
of the land on which the cause of action arose,98 and the importance of the issues at stake to tribal
interests.99 Further, the relative weight these factors should be accorded is not always clear.100
Although this article focuses on tribal law in state courts, the outer boundaries of tribalcourt jurisdiction are also relevant in several ways to the role of state courts in applying tribal
law. Where tribal courts lack power to hear a case with tribal contacts, state courts are generally
the only available forum. Rules about which cases tribal courts are forbidden to hear, therefore,
determine which cases state courts will end up adjudicating and ensure that many cases involving
tribal contacts will end up in state court. In addition, tribal adjudicatory and regulatory
jurisdiction are generally coextensive, and limits on both forms of tribal jurisdiction may have
implications for how state courts conceive of tribal sovereignty for choice-of-law purposes.
In light of these considerations, the following section thus explores the current state of
tribal-court adjudicative power, first briefly describing the cases in which the Court has
announced limits on tribal jurisdiction, then considering in more detail the effects of the regime
the Court has created.
a. Rewriting Tribal Sovereignty
In the late 1970s, the Court surprised many observers when it first held that there were
limits to the sovereign authority of tribes to regulate or punish the conduct of nonmembers.101 In
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Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court held that the Suquamish Tribe lacked criminal
jurisdiction over a nonmember who had been arrested and charged with assaulting a tribal
officer. 102 Finding that tribes had lost much of their inherent powers by virtue of their
incorporation into the “overriding sovereignty” of the United States,103 the Court held that tribes
possessed only “‘quasi-sovereign’ authority” and were prohibited from exercising powers
“inconsistent with [this] status.”104
Although Oliphant suggested that limitations on tribal sovereignty were narrow and
confined to the area of criminal jurisdiction,105 in relatively short time the Court extended these
restrictions to the civil context. In Montana v. United States,106 the Court set out the principles
of tribal regulatory jurisdiction that have guided it for the past quarter-century. Montana’s
immediate holding was that the Crow Tribe lacked power to regulate hunting and fishing by
nonmembers on privately owned land within the reservation.107 More generally, the Court found,
tribes did not possess any sovereign powers “beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations.”108 These limits on tribal powers were subject to just
two explicit exceptions. Tribes might permissibly regulate “the activities of nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” and retained the power to “exercise civil authority over
the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
102
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tribe.”109 Further, the Court suggested, the Tribe might legitimately exercise power to regulate
the activities of non-Indians on tribal trust land or Indian-owned land.110
The Court did not immediately apply Montana to the tribal adjudicative context; in fact, it
initially gave indications that tribal jurisdiction extended more broadly than regulatory
jurisdiction. In Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,111 the Court observed that “[a]lthough the
criminal jurisdiction of the tribal courts is subject to substantial federal limitation . . . their civil
jurisdiction is not similarly restricted.” Instead, the Court found, “[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts.”112
Contemporary observers noted a tension between the restrictive approach of Montana and
LaPlante’s broad affirmation of tribal-court power.113 In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,114 the Court
finally resolved the tension in favor of the Montana approach, holding that “[a]s to nonmembers,
… a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.” Strate involved
a collision between two vehicles, one driven by the widow of a Three Affiliated Tribes member
and one driven by a non-Indian contractor doing on-reservation landscaping work for a tribal
community building.115 The accident occurred on a state highway within the geographical
boundaries of the reservation.116 The injured woman, who was not herself a tribe member, and
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her children, all members of the tribe, sued the non-Indian contractor in tribal court.117 The
Court held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the case. While again emphasizing that
“tribes retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land,” the Court
nonetheless found that, in this case “[t]he right-of-way North Dakota acquired for the State's
highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to
alienated, non-Indian land.”118 The Court thus rested its decision on Montana’s “general rule”
that, apart from exceptions for consensual relationships and actions directly affecting the tribe’s
political integrity, “tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian
land within a reservation.”119
Even as it clarified the law to some extent, Strate also signaled that multiple factors
would have to be taken into account in determining whether tribal court jurisdiction existed. The
facts of Strate, on their face, pointed in more than one direction. The accident had occurred on
tribal trust land within the reservation; on the other hand, the state had a right-of-way over the
land.120 By virtue of his work on the reservation, the contractor-defendant had voluntarily
entered into at least a minimal relationship with the tribe; nonetheless, the connection was not
extensive enough to trigger Montana’s exception for consensual relationships.121 Although
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several of the plaintiffs were tribe members, the injured woman was not.122 While the Court did
not indicate that any of these facts was individually dispositive, the tribe would almost certainly
have had a far stronger case for jurisdiction had all facts pointed more definitively toward the
tribe.
In Nevada v. Hicks,123 the Court purported to clarify Strate’s holding, but may have only
succeeded in further complicating the issue. Hicks, a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone
Tribes living on the reservation, sued state and tribal officers in tribal court, claiming that in the
course of searching his house, they had damaged his property and exceeded the bounds of their
warrant.124 As an ironic result of the extensive cooperation that had occurred between state and
federal authorities, the case presented complex issues of overlapping state and tribal power. The
state court had conditioned its search warrant for Hicks’s property on the agreement of tribal
authorities, and the state game warden and a tribal officer ultimately conducted the search
jointly.125 Hicks’s suit alleged claims for trespass to land and chattels and abuse of process; he
also claimed several violations of his federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.126
The Court phrased the central question narrowly, as concerning only the tribe’s
adjudicative jurisdiction over “state officers enforcing state law” — and in particular over state
officers seeking evidence of an off-reservation crime.127 With the question thus framed, the
Court found that the Tribe’s lack of authority was clear.
As far as this part of the decision went, Hicks represented an easy application of Strate
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and Montana, rather than an extension of them. Indeed, the Court took care to frame the first
part of its holding with almost comically narrow precision, as addressed only to the question of
“whether a tribal court may assert jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials who entered
tribal land to execute a search warrant against a tribe member suspected of having violated state
law outside the reservation.”128
The second part of the Court’s holding was, however, more surprising. The Court also
found that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the several federal claims Hicks asserted under
§ 1983. The Court based this holding on “the restrictions inherent in tribal court jurisdiction,”
which “made it impossible that they be courts of general jurisdiction.”129 Thus, the Court
suggested, tribal courts could entertain federal causes of action only when Congress had
specifically so provided.130 In reaching this conclusion, the Court went beyond Strate’s
conclusion that tribal adjudicative jurisdiction did not exceed legislative jurisdiction; the Court’s
decision to leave open “whether a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmember defendants
equals its legislative jurisdiction” allowed for the possibility that the Court might ultimately find
adjudicative jurisdiction to be the narrower of the two. 131 Further, the Court indicated for the
first time that this limitation on tribal courts was one of subject-matter jurisdiction132 and hence,
presumably, nonwaivable. Thus, while Strate did not represent a radical extension of Hicks, the
new restrictions on tribal jurisdiction it announced were nonetheless significant.
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b. Tribal Cases In State Court: The Impact of Strate and Hicks
In Strate and Hicks, the Court established a balance between a tribe’s legislative and
adjudicative jurisdiction that is, in many ways, the opposite the balance that exists with respect to
states. In contrast to tribal courts under the regime that Strate and Hicks established, state courts
have far more extensive jurisdiction to hear disputes involving Indian litigants than state
legislatures do to regulate the conduct of tribe members.133 More generally, the jurisdiction of
state courts is broader than, and distinct from, the realm in which state legislatures can
permissibly regulate; to take the most obvious example, an out-of-state defendant may be haled
into court under a long-arm statute to answer for conduct that the state legislature could not
regulate directly.134 In finding tribal jurisdiction to be no greater — and possibly less extensive
— than tribal regulatory power, the Court signaled a view of tribal courts that could scarcely
have been more different from the one it had expressed in Williams.
Hicks also complicated the decision to bring a case in tribal court in another way — by
casting doubt upon the factors that the Court in Strate had suggested would be central to a
determination of tribal jurisdiction. Strate had indicated that a significant consideration in
establishing the existence of tribal jurisdiction was whether the land on which relevant events
had occurred was tribal-owned trust land or private fee land.135 The Hicks Court, by contrast,
found that “[t]he ownership status of land . . . is only one factor to consider in determining
whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government
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or to control internal relations.’”136 Thus, Hicks not only indicated that the existence of tribal
jurisdiction would remain a fact-based, case-by-case analysis, but put litigants on notice that the
factors that would be considered in this analysis remained subject to change.137
Therefore, the effect of Strate and Hicks has been not only to restrict tribal courts’
jurisdiction over many claims that concern tribal matters, but to ensure that a litigant will often
have to endure lengthy uncertainty before receiving a tribal court judgment that is free of
jurisdictional challenge.138 By contrast, Indians always have the option of bringing cases against
nonmembers in state court; indeed, under Wold I and II, state courts are required to hear such
cases. Thus, the Court’s decisions may be said to have limited tribal-court jurisdiction in two
ways: first, by establishing a class of claims that tribal courts are prohibited from hearing;
second, by creating another class of claims in which a case can be made for tribal-court
jurisdiction, but where considerations of efficiency, convenience, and jurisdictional certainty are
likely to make state court the more appealing choice.
As a result of Strate and Hicks, therefore, the tribe may effectively lose all say in the
outcome of many cases that have a clear relationship to tribe members and tribal lands. The
136
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Court, however, has never explicitly considered the tribal-sovereignty issues that are entailed in
shunting this class of cases into state rather than tribal court. Indeed, the Court has essentially
suggested that, for a tribal plaintiff, any remedy is a good remedy — in other words, as long as
the plaintiff can recover in state court, the unavailability of a tribal forum is no great injustice.139
Setting aside the issue of whether this is true in individual cases — and it may not be, either
because tribal law is more favorable to plaintiffs than state law or because bringing the claim in
state court entails severe inconvenience140 — the Court’s approach is problematic because it
gives no weight to the tribe’s institutional interests in having cases in which the tribe has a
legitimate interest decided according to tribal law. This is a notable contrast to the Court’s
language in cases like Fisher, in which it suggested that the preferences of individual Indian
litigants for state forums must be subordinated to the tribe’s stake in having internal legal issues
decided in its own courts.141 By contrast, Strate and Hicks assume that, as long an individual
Indian plaintiff has her day in court, no substantial unfairness has resulted.
The forum-based approach the Supreme Court has followed is thus both cumbersome
from a standpoint of judicial economy and inadequate to serve many legitimate tribal sovereign
interests. The next section considers how the state-tribal case allocation problem might be reimagined, at least in part, as a choice-of-law question, and how such an approach might better
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serve the needs of states, tribes, and litigants.
II.

Applying Choice-of-Law Principles in the Tribal Context
As the preceding section has sought to establish, the forum-selection rules the Supreme

Court has established have generally (if not exclusively) operated against a background
assumption that both state and tribal courts will apply forum law. In addition, the Supreme Court
has made clear that tribal courts may only exercise jurisdiction in cases to which the tribe could
apply tribal law in any case, and that Congress, in general, does not intend for tribal courts to
hear federal causes of action. No such barrier exists, of course, to tribal-court application of state
law, and some tribes do, in fact, apply state law — for example, to fill in gaps in tribal codes.142
But no general principle of federal Indian law obliges tribes to do so. Moreover, as the Supreme
Court has increasingly restricted tribal-court jurisdiction to matters concerning the internal
relations of tribes, most cases brought in tribal court are likely to involve tribe members and
concern matters occurring solely within the boundaries of the reservation. Thus, it is normally a
fair expectation that when a case is brought in tribal court, tribal law should and will apply.
The purpose of this section is to argue that the parallel proposition need not prevail in
state court — that is, that when matters involving Indians appear in state court, state courts
should not automatically apply state law.143 Instead, states should treat tribes in the same
manner as they do sister states or foreign nations, consulting their usual choice-of-law principles
to determine whether tribal law should be applied.
In one sense, this is not a surprising recommendation. More than one commentator has
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observed that state choice-of-law principles, considered in the abstract, would frequently dictate
the application of tribal law to state-court cases.144 Some state courts have, in fact, experimented
with applying tribal law.145 Other state courts, however, have hesitated to do so for a variety of
reasons. State courts have expressed concerns that the application of tribal law by a non-Indian
court constitutes an infringement on tribal sovereignty; they have also worried that the process of
establishing the content of tribal law on a given subject is simply too difficult. 146 Far more
frequently, however, state courts have, with little explanation, simply neglected to engage in
choice-of-law analysis at all, simply assuming that state law will apply to cases involving tribes
that are brought in state court.147
Under current choice-of-law principles, this assumption is simply not viable. Although
the atypical nature of tribal sovereignty may require some adjustments, state courts following
commonly accepted choice-of-law principles should apply tribal law to many of the cases
involving tribal matters over which they have jurisdiction. Further, such a practice would have
distinct advantages, promoting tribal interests while more generally facilitating greater efficiency
and judicial economy in cases that cross reservation borders.
A.

The Development and Content of Modern Choice-of-Law Theory
The field of conflicts of law attempts to address a basic problem: What should a court do

when confronted with a case to which the law of more than one sovereign could apply? Such
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defendants, and are open to suits by out-of-state plaintiffs. Choice-of-law problems, therefore,
have vexed courts for at least several centuries148; they are particularly common in the United
States, where plaintiffs have great flexibility in selecting a forum and where many cases involve
contacts with a variety of states.
The idea that the courts of one sovereign might enforce the laws of another has
historically been a source of some perplexity. After all, once a forum has established its
jurisdiction over a case, forum law might seem the best candidate for the law that should govern;
it is the law with which the forum state is most familiar and seemingly has the clearest authority
to apply.149 Nonetheless, there are practical and philosophical difficulties with the application of
forum law in every case. Most obviously, such a practice promotes forum-shopping, since strong
incentives would exist for both plaintiffs and defendants to try to have the case heard in the
forum with the most favorable law.150 Further, a forum-centered approach has the potential to
create stark instances of unfairness — perhaps even, in extreme cases, constitutional problems151
— if forum law were applied to govern the actions of defendants who possessed only a minimal
connection to the forum. For these and other reasons,152 all 50 states have historically been
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willing to apply the law of other states (and, generally, of other nations as well) when certain
conditions are met.153
Prior to the mid-twentieth century, most states followed a similar set of relatively brightline choice-of-law principles. These principles tended to be grounded in geography and territory,
resting on the premise that a given cause of action should be governed by the law of the place
where relevant events occurred.154 Under the traditional approach, for example, the validity of a
contract was governed by the law of the place of contracting, while breach of contract was
governed by the law of the place of performance. 155 Under the principle of lex loci delicti — the
law of the place of the wrong — torts were governed by the law of the state where the injury had
occurred.156 Matters that were purely procedural were nearly always governed by the law of the
forum.157 These clear, precise principles — which had the advantage of being easy to apply and
the disadvantage of being rigid — were described at length in the Restatement (First) of Conflict
of Laws, which appeared in 1934.158
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Choice-of-law theorists gave two competing explanations for the use of these principles
as a way to resolve conflicts between the law of the forum and that of another sovereign. Joseph
H. Beale, whose theories had wide influence on choice-of-law doctrine in many states,
propounded the notion of “vested rights” — the idea that, as soon as the relevant elements of a
cause of action recognized in a particular place occurred, they immediately gave rise to a right
that persisted across state borders and that courts in other jurisdictions were bound to respect.159
By contrast, another influential treatise by Justice Story held that a sovereign’s decision to
enforce another’s law was purely voluntary. According to Story, state law was only directly
applicable to “all property … within its territory; and all persons, who are resident within it, …
and also all contracts made, and acts done within it.”160 Therefore, when jurisdictions applied
foreign law, they did so as a matter of comity, not necessity.161 While Beale and Story thus
offered nearly opposite justifications for the applicability of foreign law, their theories shared a
territorial focus — focusing on the power states had over events occurring within their borders.
The territorial view of Beale, Story, and the First Restatement prevailed for many
decades. Toward the middle of the twentieth century, however, courts and legal scholars began
to criticize the first Restatement principles, noting that they were overly formalistic and, as a
result, highly susceptible to manipulation. Courts intent on applying the law of one state rather
than another could, for example, strain to find that a given foreign-state law was procedural
rather than substantive, or that a contract case was really about validity rather than breach.
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Brainerd Currie, perhaps the most famous of the academic reformers, blasted the First
Restatement’s methodology as “loaded with escape devices,” including the device of “novel or
disingenuous characterization” described above, the device of “manipulating the connecting
factor” (i.e., emphasizing or de-emphasizing the importance of a particular contact), and the
device of declaring a foreign state’s law to be against “local public policy” as a basis for not
applying the relevant law.162
More substantively, courts and scholars began to question whether the rigid categories of
the Restatement rested on a sensible doctrinal and theoretical foundation.163 Perhaps because of
the influence of Beale and the vested rights theory, choice-of-law principles tended to focus on a
single moment at which a cause of action became complete — ignoring the fact that other
relevant conduct may have taken place at an earlier point. Questions of contract validity, for
example, focused on the place of execution, even if the contract had been negotiated elsewhere;
tort cases considered only the place of injury, even if that injury was the direct result of negligent
conduct in another state. Further, by focusing exclusively on place, courts ignored other
significant considerations, such as the policies reflected in a given law and the interests a state
might have in the well-being of its citizens even when they traveled beyond state borders.164
Ultimately, these criticisms helped to launch what has become known as the “conflicts
revolution,”165 a series of competing proposals for choice-of-law principles to replace the First
Restatement approach. Among the more influential proposals put forth was the method of
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resolving conflicts known as “interest analysis,” developed and advanced by Brainerd Currie.166
Under Currie’s proposal, when a party urged the application of a law other than forum law, a
court was to look to the “governmental policy expressed in [forum] law” and determine whether
the forum had an interest in having its law applied.167 If the forum lacked any such interest and
the foreign state had an interest, foreign law would apply; in all other cases, forum law would
apply.168 Courts would determine what constituted an “interest” by considering whether
application of the law would directly advance the law’s underlying policy.
Most famously, Currie considered a common choice-of-law problem of his era: the
enforcement of contracts entered into by married women, which under the paternalistic policies
of the time were invalid under the laws of certain states.169 Currie’s key recognition was that a
state might not have an equal interest in applying a particular law, such as the married woman’s
disability, to every transaction. Under Massachusetts law of the time, for example, married
women’s contracts were not enforceable.170 As Currie recognized, however, this law had been
enacted for the protection of Massachusetts women.171 Therefore, if a Massachusetts creditor
wished to enforce a contract executed by a married woman residing in Maine, a state that
enforced married women’s contracts, Massachusetts should have no objection to enforcing the
contract and Maine law should thus apply. In Currie’s view, therefore, this was an example of a
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false conflict — a case in which Maine and Massachusetts law might differ, but in which only
one state (in this case, Maine) had a genuine interest in the application of its law.172
Currie’s proposals were both hailed and criticized by commentators. Many academics
pointed out flaws in Currie’s approach — in particular, its strong bias in favor of forum law,
which Currie’s critics believed that he had failed to justify adequately173 — and offered their own
diverse proposals. Some were variations on interest analysis; William Baxter, for example,
argued that courts should resolve true conflicts between state laws by “determin[ing] which
state’s internal objective will be least impaired by subordination [to another state’s interest] in
cases like the one before it.”174 Others advocated wholly different methods of resolving
conflicts. Robert A. Leflar, for example, advocated that courts choose the law that was “better,”
in the sense of “mak[ing] good socio-economic sense for the time in which the court speaks”175
— a view opposite to that of Currie, who believed that courts should not be in the business of
making policy-based choices between the laws of different states.176 Courts as well as academics
worked out alternatives to the traditional principles. In 1963, New York broke forcefully with
tradition by announcing that it would make choice-of-law determinations based on the relative
number of contacts the litigants had with each competing jurisdiction and the degree of interest
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each jurisdiction had in seeing its law applied to the case177 — a method the court described as
the “center of gravity” approach.178 Other states, including California179 and Pennsylvania,180
developed their own methods as well.
Because of the lack of consensus about the direction reform should take, the drafting of
the Second Restatement was a source of controversy, and many were displeased with the ultimate
result, published in 1971.181 A central problem was that the Second Restatement provided courts
with an array of factors to apply, but offered little guidance as to which should be most
important. The Second Restatement’s general approach was to instruct courts to choose the law
of the state with the “most significant relationship” to the cause of action; that determination,
however, was in itself based on a variety of factors. For example, where torts were concerned,
courts were to look the traditional place-of-injury criterion, but also to consider other factors: the
place of conduct causing the injury; the domicile, residence, and place of business of the parties;
and the place where the parties’ relationship was “centered.”182 Unhelpfully, the Restatement
added that “[t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.”183
The Restatement’s approach to contract law was similar. Although it advocated general
deference to the parties’ choice of law, in the absence of any effective choice it counseled courts
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to look to a motley assortment of factors, some traditionally territorial — such as the place of
contracting and the place of performance — and some more novel, such as the domicile of the
parties.184 To further complicate matters, the Second Restatement was unclear about the degree
to which it actually represented a break with tradition, instead suggesting that in most cases it
would produce results similar to those mandated by the previous Restatement. In several
sections discussing specific tort problems, for example, the Second Restatement included the
comment that “[t]he applicable law will usually be the local law of the state where the injury
occurred”185 — a statement that echoed the First Restatement.186
Perhaps as a result of the fact that the Second Restatement did not take a strong stand in
choosing among competing methods, the decades since the Second Restatement have resulted in
a diversity of approaches from state to state. Where tort law is concerned, for example, ten states
currently follow traditional First Restatement principles, about twice that number follow the
Second Restatement, and the remainder follow other modern approaches.187 The breakdown of
approaches is similar in contracts, although some states that apply traditional principles to torts
adopt modern doctrines for contracts and vice versa.188 There is considerable diversity even
among the smaller subgroup of states that hear the majority of Indian-law cases. New Mexico,
for example, follows traditional principles; Arizona, Montana, Oklahoma, Washington, South
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Dakota, and Utah189 generally follow the Second Restatement; and California, Minnesota, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin follow other modern principles.190
Nonetheless, despite the increased variety that prevails in the post-Second Restatement
era, the choice-of-law principles of many states continue to have elements in common. For
example, most states take into account, to a greater or lesser extent, some or all of the following
factors: the domicile, residence, and workplace of the parties; the place of relevant events; the
interests of the various states whose law may be at issue; and the expectations of the parties.191
Further, choice-of-law theory has not escaped its traditional territoriality.192 Sometimes the
territorial element is obvious, in both traditional factors such as the place of injury and “modern”
ones such as party domicile. Other factors have a subtler territorial component. Party
expectations, for example, may be affected by the place where the majority of relevant events, or
the most significant ones, occurred.193 Further, it is hard to talk about state governmental interest
without talking about geography, since states are generally considered to have little or no
legitimate interest in regulating events that occur outside their borders and cause no effects inside
them.194
Whatever their other differences, therefore, choice-of-law theories tend to rely on a placebased notion of political power — the idea that states have legitimate interests in the events that
occur within their borders and the people who reside there. There is inevitable difficulty in
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See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 Yale L.J. 1277, 1306 (1989) (“Clearly there is no
way to formulate a choice of law regime other than to found it upon territorial assumptions of some sort.”)
193
Any regime based on party expectations is, of course, inevitably circular: people’s expectations will be shaped by
what the law is. But the expectation that, within territorial boundaries of a given sovereign, one is subject to that
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translating these notions to the Indian-law context, where the scope of tribal regulatory and
adjudicatory jurisdiction is not based merely on geography, but on a complex mix of geography,
land ownership, tribal membership, and strength of tribal interests.
B.

Making Sense of Choice of Law in the Tribal Context
The following section considers how choice-of-law concepts might be applied in the

tribal context. This section first considers the issues entailed — both in the abstract and in
practice — when state courts attempt to apply territorial notions in a realm in which the reach of
sovereign authority is more uncertain. Second, it considers how a choice-of-law approach might
be better suited than the current case-allocation regime to creating fair and efficient ways of
resolving disputes that contain tribal contacts.
1. The Initial Problem of Translation
The territorial emphasis shared by most choice-of-law systems rests on the normally
unproblematic assumption that a political entity has jurisdiction over events that occur within its
borders, and further that such borders are familiar, predictable, and easy to discern.195 In the
Indian-law context, such assumptions do not always hold. The reservation’s boundaries may be
clear, but the reservation is nonetheless a place where, the Supreme Court has told us, tribes and
states share regulatory authority196; conversely, under the statutory definition of “Indian
country,”197 tribal authority may extend to pockets of Indian-owned land outside the reservation.
Further, according to the Montana line of cases, the degree of authority the tribe possesses over a
194

Brilmayer, supra note 192.
As one commentator has observed, for example, “A rule of law may be construed to either to apply to people,
things and transactions within a state, or to apply to the state’s subjects, wherever they may happen to be.” Friedrich
K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 Am. J. Comp. J. 1. 10-12, 33-44 (1984).
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particular parcel of land depends not only on whether it is within or outside Indian country, but
also on a host of other factors: whether or not the land is tribal trust land198; if the land is
privately owned, whether it is owned by a member or a nonmember of the tribe199; whether the
state has a right-of-way over the land200; whether the land is especially significant to tribal life201;
and even whether the land is deep within the reservation or closer to its borders.202
As a result, the answers to normally straightforward choice-of-law questions are more
complicated when events occur in Indian country. When an Indian is injured on a reservation by
the negligent conduct of nonmember, for example, what is the “place” of the injury for choice-oflaw purposes? The most obvious answer, of course, is that the place is the reservation itself. Yet
this assumption is not free of difficulties. A tribe does not have complete control over its own
territory; in all likelihood, it could not hale the nonmember-tortfeasor into its own courts, and it

concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory”).
197
See 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
198
Strate, 520 U.S. at 454.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), one of the rare cases in which the Court
has applied Montana’s “political integrity” exception, illustrates the fact-bound nature of tribal legislative
jurisdiction. The case concerned two parcels of land located on the Yakima Reservation: a 160-acre tract owned by
Philip Brendale, who was “part Indian but not a member of the Yakima Nation,” and who had inherited the parcel
from family members; and a 40-acre tract “bordered on the north by trust land and on the other three sides by fee
land,” owned by Stanley Wilkinson, a non-Indian and nonmember. Id. at 417-18. Further complicating matters,
Brendale’s parcel was in a forested “closed area” of the reservation open only to Yakima Nation members and
permittees; Wilkinson’s parcel was in an unrestricted “open area” of which nearly half was fee land. Id. at 415-16.
In an opinion composed of fractured pluralities, the Court held that Brendale’s parcel fell within the “political
integrity” exception to Montana and was thus subject to tribal zoning regulations; Wilkinson’s, however, did not.
Justice Stevens’s concurrence, which announced the court’s judgment on Brendale’s parcel, found that the division
of the reservation lands into a closed area consisting mostly of nonfee land and an open area with a large percentage
of fee land was a fact of “critical importance” to the case. Id. at 437 Justice Stevens further relied on the character
of the closed area’s use as an “undeveloped refuge of cultural and religious significance,” noting that the tribe had
invoked its power to exclude nonmembers from the area and thus “preserved the power to define the essential
character of that area.” Id. at 441. While acknowledging that his opinion was subject to the criticism that “it does not
identify a bright-line rule,” Justice Stevens defended his approach on the grounds that “the factual predicate to these
cases is itself complicated” such that it was impossible for the Court to “articulate precise rules.” Id. at 447-48.
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492 U.S. at 441.
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could not otherwise exercise sovereign power to fine or punish the nonmember for her behavior.
While the reservation is clearly the “place” of the injury in the geographical sense, it is less
obvious that it is the “place” in a choice-of-law sense.
Other choice-of-law factors state courts consider may also be difficult to translate into the
Indian-law context. Some courts, for example, take into account the parties’ domicile in
deciding which state’s law to apply.203 For purposes of determining jurisdiction in Indian law,
however, a party’s decision to live on or off the reservation has always been secondary to the
facts of that person’s race (Indian or non-Indian) and political status (member or nonmember of
the tribe).204 Should the same be true in choice-of-law determinations?
The factor of party expectations may also point in a different direction where tribal law is
concerned. Choice-of-law doctrines generally rely to some extent on the premise that, when
someone, say, crosses from New York into Pennsylvania, that person is more likely to expect that
Pennsylvania rather than New York law will apply to any transaction he may enter into or any
events that may occur.205 In Indian-law cases, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that a
non-Indian who enters a reservation does not expect to be subject to tribal law — and, indeed,
that application of such law may therefore be unfair.206
203

Brilmayer has described domicile as having two components — “voice and exit.” Brilmayer, supra note 192, at
1307. While the concept of “exit” should presumably mean the same thing in the Indian-law context as it does in
relations between states — that is, people have the same choice whether to live on or leave the reservation as they do
whether to leave or remain in a given state — the idea of “voice” is more complex, since tribes commonly grant
voting rights only to members. Should “voice” be understood narrowly as having to do with political rights, and
should only members of the tribe therefore be considered fully “domiciled” on the reservation? Or should domicile
encompass a broader notion of community and self-identification, so that nonmembers who live on the reservation,
particularly if they have ties to the tribe or participate in tribal life, should be considered to have made the
reservation their domicile?
204
See, e.g., Strate, 520 U.S. at 443 n.2 (finding that question of whether plaintiff resided on the reservation was
“immaterial”).
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See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(d).
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See id. at 459 (expressing reluctance to require non-Indians to litigate a “commonplace state highway accident
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State courts have mostly dealt with these problems by ignoring them. Only very rarely
have state courts have considered whether their choice-of-law principles require them to apply
tribal law; in the few occasions when state courts have addressed the issue, they have often
quickly dismissed the possibility of applying tribal law.207
Whatever problems may exist in applying choice-of-law principles to the tribal context,
this clearly cannot always be the right result. That is, however restrictively one understands the
meaning of core choice-of-law concepts such as “place” or “domicile,” cases unquestionably
exist in which a consistent application of choice-of-law principles should dictate the application
of tribal law.
To see how this is so, consider the traditional principle that the law of the place of the
injury should control tort cases. In this context, the phrase “the law of the place” might be said to
mean one of two things. One might choose to place the emphasis on “place” — in other words,
the entity within whose geographical borders an event occurs — and then apply the law of the
sovereign with which that place is associated. In other words, if an event occurs within the
reservation, the reservation is the “place,” and the “law of the place” is therefore tribal law.
Second, one might, alternatively, place the emphasis on “law,” and view the phrase instead as
referring to the sovereign possessing direct regulatory authority over events that occur in a
particular place. When an event occurs within a reservation, either the state or the tribe might
have that authority, depending on the various relevant factors enumerated in the Montana line of
cases. Thus, under the second view, if the conduct at issue occurs, say, on the private land of a

claim in an unfamiliar court”).
207
See supra note 13.
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nonmember, the “law of the place,” if understood to mean the law that actually applies208 in that
place, under those circumstances, may be state law, even if the land is nominally located within
the reservation.
However, there will certainly be cases in which both definitions are satisfied — if, for
example, a tort occurs within the geographical boundaries of a reservation under circumstances
in which the tribe would have authority to regulate the tortfeasor’s conduct. When this is the
case, the conclusion seems inescapable that, under most choice-of-law principles, tribal law
should apply; what, other than tribal law, could possibly qualify as the “law of the place”?209
Indeed, if one takes seriously some of the Court’s language in Wold,210 application of state law
under such circumstances might be preempted under federal law as conflicting with federal
policies promoting tribal sovereignty and self-government.
Many other situations exist in which state courts should in theory have little difficulty
applying tribal law. The factor of domicile, for example, is surely satisfied when a litigant is a
tribe member and lives on the reservation. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that a party who
is a member of the tribe and performs an action on tribal trust land expects that tribal law will
apply to his conduct; in states that place weight on the factor of party expectations, therefore, a
strong argument would exist that tribal law should apply under such circumstances. Finally,
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The question of which law “applies” to particular events is, of course, a somewhat circular one when the subject
under discussion is choice-of-law doctrine. When a case concerning certain events is brought before a state court,
the law that “applies” to those events will be the law of whatever sovereign the court chooses to apply. In a more
narrow sense, however, it can be said that state law, rather than tribal law, applies to certain events taking place
within the reservation because the tribe has no power to exercise its regulatory authority over those events.
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This analysis of the “law of the place” is not merely relevant to states that follow the traditional approach, since
conflicts law is permeated by geographical assumptions; even in the Second Restatement, place is usually a starting
point for a choice-of-law analysis.
210
See 476 U.S. at 889 (describing a requirement that tribes submit to state law as a prerequisite to access to state
court as a “severe intrusion” on their sovereignty).
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many states have adopted by statute choice-of-law principles that appear to allow for the
application of tribal law. For example, provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code allow
parties to a contract great latitude to select what law should apply.211 Under such statutes, there
is no apparent barrier to allowing parties to elect by contract to have tribal law apply to contracts
involving tribes or their members.212
Thus, there are many circumstances under which choice-of-law principles appear to point
unequivocally toward the application of tribal law. It is also important, however, to note that
such “easy” cases do not exhaust the circumstances under which tribal law might apply to cases
that appear in state court. The discussion above has considered how state choice-of-law
principles may sometimes dictate the application of tribal law even if concepts like “place” and
“domicile” are given their narrowest possible meaning. Yet taking such a narrow view would be
an anomaly in state choice-of-law practice; indeed, states generally construe such concepts
expansively. For example, where state-to-state conflicts of law are concerned, courts have
generally assumed that “place” refers to any location within a state or nation’s geographical
boundaries, not to the abstract reach of that entity’s sovereign authority. This is even true,
perhaps even especially so, in states that follow the traditional principles of the First
Restatement, which are designed to establish bright-line, formalistic rules that apply regardless of
real-world conditions.213 The famous case of Alabama Great Southern RR Co. v. Carroll,214 for
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See Uniform Commercial Code § 1-105 (parties may agree that their rights and duties will be governed by the law
of a non-forum state or nation if such law bears a “reasonable relation” to the transaction).
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In practice, such situations have been relatively uncommon, since contractual clauses specifying that tribal law
will be applied to disputes often also require that suits be brought in tribal court. Nonetheless, after Hicks, it may be
the case that parties have more a greater ability to elect that their dispute be governed by tribal law than they do to
ensure that their case will be heard in a tribal forum.
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Though the court in Carroll used Beale’s now-discredited vested rights approach as a rationale for reaching this
result, most courts that still subscribe to traditional principles have applied them based on other justifications, such
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example, involved a train passing through several Southern states. Negligent maintenance of the
train in Alabama caused a link between two cars in a freight train to break in Mississippi,
injuring the plaintiff.215 Although the plaintiff claimed that Alabama law should apply,216 the
court nonetheless applied Mississippi law because it was in Mississippi that the injury had
occurred.217 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that Mississippi would certainly
have had no power to pass laws directly regulating the maintenance of trains in Alabama. While
the doctrinal reasons why tribes cannot directly regulate most nonmember conduct are of course
somewhat different from the reasons Mississippi cannot regulate conduct outside its borders, it is
difficult to see why the two situations should be, for choice-of-law purposes, distinguishable.218
In certain cases under the traditional approach, the courts of the state whose law is to be
applied may, in fact, lack adjudicative as well as regulatory jurisdiction over the matter; this
might be the case if, for example, a state’s long-arm statute allows for only limited jurisdiction
over nonresidents in state court.219 Thus, one could make the argument that if states were to apply
the more restrictive view of the notion of “law of the place,” as described above, to cases with
tribal contacts, they would in fact be departing from ordinary choice-of-law practice.

as that of predictability and ease of administration. See, e.g., Paul v. Nat’l Life, 177 W.Va. 427 (1986).
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By way of analogy, a federal criminal statute incorporating tribal law has been held to apply even in cases where
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In states that follow more modern, multifactor choice-of-law theories, the path to
application of tribal law may be, if anything, even clearer. In fact, once one overcomes the initial
hurdle of translating choice-of-law concepts to the Indian-law context, certain of the “modern”
approaches — in particular, interest analysis and the “most significant relationship” approach of
the Second Restatement — lend themselves peculiarly well to cases involving tribal contacts.220
Consider first how theories incorporating interest analysis might apply. Suppose a tribe
— call it Tribe A — enacts an ordinance requiring creditors to seek authorization from the tribe
before repossessing property from a tribe member residing on the reservation. The governmental
policy reflected in this rule is fairly clear: to protect the tribe members from arbitrary or
unwarranted seizures of property. Further, the nature of the governmental policy underlying the
ordinance does not change simply because, under Strate and Hicks, the tribe’s ability to enforce it
against nonmembers in tribal court is limited. Tribe A, that is, likely has an equal interest in
protecting its members from unfair seizures by members and those by nonmembers; it simply
lacks jurisdiction to hold nonmembers accountable for their conduct in tribal court.
Now suppose that, under the law of State B, a secured creditor in general has the right to
use self-help to repossess property on which a debtor has defaulted. Let us assume that State B
has passed this law in order to protect the financial interest of in-state corporations that have
agreed to sell goods on credit.221 In any given case, however, this interest may or may not be
implicated. If, for example, the original deal had been struck in State C between a Tribe A
220

In fact, such methods bear some similarities to courts’ current forum-centered approach. See Pearson, supra note
4, at 726 (noting that “[f]ederal [jurisdictional] law about Indians is a type of ‘interest analysis,’ a concept central to
modern doctrine on Conflicts of Law”).
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This was in fact the case in Belone; New Mexico had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, which gives
secured parties the right to use self-help in repossessing property. See Belone, at 134 N.M. at 134-35 (citing N.M.
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member and a State C corporation, and the Tribe A member sued in State B court for violation of
the tribal statute, 222 State B would have no interest in applying its law, while Tribe A would have
an interest in ensuring the security of its member’s property. Under Currie’s view, this would
therefore constitute a “false conflict” to which Tribe A law should apply.
If the corporation were in fact located in State B, of course, a real conflict would
exist — Tribe A’s interest in protecting its members and State B’s interest in protecting
its creditors could not both be accommodated. Currie’s approach would, in such a
situation, apply forum law. However, other governmental-interest-based theories, such as
Leflar’s “better law” principle or Baxter’s “comparative impairment” approach, might by
contrast point toward tribal law. Whatever the outcome, however, each of these theories
has the advantage of allowing state courts to step back from the case-allocation rules
established by Montana and Williams to consider what stake the tribe actually has in any
given case. Unlike Montana and Williams, that is, which give different weight to a tribe’s
interests in litigation depending on whether a tribe member is a plaintiff or defendant and
whether the other litigant involved is Indian or non-Indian, governmental interest analysis
allows state courts to take into account a tribe’s legitimate interest in protecting the
welfare of its members in all of these situations.
Approaches that rely on assessing the quantity and significance of contacts with various
jurisdictions — the approach predominantly taken by, among other authorities, the Second
Restatement — are also well suited to the tribal-law context. In state-to-state conflicts, these

Stat. Ann. 1978, § 55-9-503 (repealed 2001)).
222
The original deal in Belone was in fact reached in Arizona, although the contract was later assigned to a New
Mexico corporation. 134 N.M. at 134.
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approaches are often derided as mere “contact-counting.”223 In the tribal-law context, however,
where the people who reside on reservations often have varying levels of tribal affiliation, an
approach that relies on assessing the number and quality of contacts may be the best way to
establish whether a given resident, or a given case, has meaningful or only incidental connections
with the tribe. A state court applying the Second Restatement might choose, for example, to
apply state rather than tribal law in a tort action involving a tourist with no ties to the tribe whose
negligent conduct occurred off the reservation, even if the injury itself occurred in Indian
country. By the same token, in a case concerning a defendant who lives and works within
reservation boundaries, who is married to a tribe member,224 and whose negligent conduct
occurred on tribal land, the decision to apply tribal law may be a relatively easy one, even if the
defendant is not technically a member of the tribe. Thus, unlike current doctrine, which often
assigns cases to a state or tribal forum based on a single factor, such as the defendant’s identity,
the Second Restatement approach allows the many factors that may be applicable in a case with
tribal contacts to be given appropriate weight.
Finally, as the third section explores in more detail, exceptions common to most choiceof-law systems may also be particularly helpful in the tribal context. Many states, for example,
permit courts to avoid application of a jurisdiction’s law, even if choice-of-law principles would
otherwise call for it, on grounds that it is against public policy. While this exception has
sometimes been criticized for giving courts too much discretion to make policy choices, it may
be a useful escape device to allow state courts to avoid the application of tribal law in situations
223
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Many tribes, for example, may require a certain blood quantum for membership; spouses and relatives of tribe
members may thus be ineligible, but are clearly members of the community. The facts of Strate illustrate this
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where the matter at issue is clearly an internal tribal one and state-court involvement would
offend tribal autonomy.
2.

The Actual Experience of State Courts

On a theoretical level, therefore, there appear to be few obstacles to applying any of the
major choice-of-law theories to cases involving tribal contacts. In practice, too, nontribal courts
that have explicitly considered the issue have had relatively little difficulty in concluding that
choice-of-law principles may under certain circumstances dictate the application of tribal law.
In Tempest Recovery Services v. Belone,225 for example, a member of the Navajo Nation, living
outside the boundaries of the reservation on allotted Indian land in New Mexico, defaulted on
payments for a car purchased in Arizona. The installment contract provided that the “law of the
state where the property is repossessed” would govern the transaction.226 Tempest, the car
dealer, entered Belone’s allotted land, repossessed the car, and sued in New Mexico court for the
outstanding balance. Belone counterclaimed for damages, citing a Navajo law providing that
“[t]he personal property of Navajo Indians shall not be taken from the territorial jurisdiction of
the Navajo Nation” unless authorized by Navajo judicial process or the purchaser’s written
consent.227
The court first found that, under Williams, it had jurisdiction over Tempest’s claim
(because it had arisen outside Indian country) and over Belone’s (because, while Belone’s cause
of action had arisen in Indian country, Belone had chosen to bring his counterclaim in state court,
phenomenon; the plaintiff, while not a tribe member, had a husband and children who were.
225
74 P.3d 67, 68 (N.M. 2003).
226
Id. at 69. The court found that this constituted, under New Mexico choice-of-law doctrine, an effective
contractual choice of law; the court took care to note, however, that Navajo law contained an equivalent contractual
choice-of-law provision.
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as envisioned by Wold). Finding that the tribe had “territorial jurisdiction” over Indian country,
the court concluded that a “choice-of-law issue … follow[ed]” from the fact that Belone’s
counterclaim had arisen there, and remanded the case to allow the district court to determine,
“under choice-of-law rules,” whether New Mexico or Navajo law applied. 228
The court’s reasoning was murky in some respects; the court apparently assumed that the
parties had intended their contract to be governed by New Mexico choice-of-law principles, not
New Mexico substantive law. Thus, the court applied New Mexico choice-of-law doctrine to
determine where the counterclaim had arisen, but appeared to assume that, because that place
was Indian country, Navajo substantive law should apply. Nonetheless, the more notable aspects
of the case are the court’s decision to treat the Navajo Nation as a separate sovereign for choiceof-law purposes, and its conclusion that any part of Indian country should be treated as Navajo
“territory” for purposes of determining where a claim had arisen. In other words, the court did
not analyze the applicability of Navajo law by examining in detail whether the tribe would have
had regulatory or adjudicatory authority over the transaction under the Montana test.229 Instead,
it simply assumed, in essence, that any location within Indian country constituted a Navajo
“place” for the purpose of determining, under state choice-of-law principles, whether Navajo law
should apply.
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Similarly, in Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc.,237 a case involving the same Navajo
repossession law, an Arizona appellate court suggested that circumstances might exist under
which comity would dictate application of tribal law under choice-of-law principles. Although
the court ultimately concluded that the parties had made a valid contractual election of Arizona
law, 241 it first considered at length whether Navajo law should be treated in the same manner as
sister-state law for choice-of-law purposes. In so doing, the court left open the possibility that
the principle of comity might under different circumstances oblige a state court to apply tribal
law.244 Although the court questioned whether the Navajo Nation was genuinely an
“independent sovereign jurisdiction,” it nevertheless noted that, applying principles of comity,
Arizona had given effect to Navajo court decisions.245 As a result, the court concluded, “if a
sufficient independent status exists in the Navajo Tribe for the courts of this state to recognize
the validity of Navajo Tribal Court decisions, then, under principles of comity, like recognition
should be extended to legislative enactments of the Navajo Tribal Council, provided, of course,
such legislative enactments are not contrary to the public policy of this state.”246 Notably, the
court did not limit potential application of tribal law to situations in which the tribe would have
adjudicative jurisdiction. Instead, the court suggested that since Arizona courts treated the
Navajo Nation as a sister sovereign for one purpose — enforcing the judgments of tribal courts
— it should also treat it as a sovereign in other respects, such as the application of tribal law
under choice-of-law principles.
237
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Several federal cases have addressed nearly identical choice-of-law issues in the context
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives the United States’s sovereign immunity for tortious
acts that occur within the United States, specifying that courts should apply “the law of the place
where the omission occurred.” For many years, courts ignored the potential applicability of tribal
law when an accident occurred in Indian country, applying state law to all issues even when tribal
lands were involved.230 In 1999, however, a federal district court in Cheromiah v. United
States231 changed the terms of debate by applying tribal law to a malpractice suit arising from
actions that occurred at a federally operated hospital on tribal lands.
The question at issue in Cheromiah was whether a New Mexico state cap on medical
malpractice damages should govern a claim arising out of allegedly negligent treatment at an
Indian Health Services facility on the Acoma reservation. Plaintiffs argued that Acoma tribal
law, which had no damage cap, constituted the “law of the place where the omission occurred”
under the federal statute. Departing from prior interpretations, the court agreed, rejecting the
view that “law of the place” means exclusively “law of the state.”232

230

See Pearson, supra note 4, at 696.
55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999).
232
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In another FTCA claim, Louis v. United States,233 a federal court, disagreeing with
Cheromiah, concluded that Congress did not intend “place” in the FTCA to refer to Indian
country. Interestingly, however, the court went on to suggest that, even if “law of the place”
meant New Mexico law, tribal law could nonetheless potentially be applied to the claim under
New Mexico choice-of-law principles.234 The plaintiff argued that, because New Mexico
followed the lex loci delicti doctrine, tribal law should govern because the negligent conduct had
occurred at a tribal hospital. Because the plaintiff had, however, ultimately died in a New
Mexico hospital, the court found that the hospital was the place of the wrong and rejected this
argument.235 However, by accepting that ordinary New Mexico choice-of-law principles applied,
the Louis court explicitly left open the possibility that application of tribal law might have been
proper had the plaintiff’s death occurred within the boundaries of Indian country.236
The application of choice-of-law principles to events in Indian country is thus often
surprisingly straightforward. Conversely, state courts that have gone to great lengths to avoid
application of tribal law have often found themselves tied in doctrinal knots. The South Dakota
case of Risse v. Meeks is a stark example of the procedural tangles the current forum-centered
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conflicting decisions on the question of whether tribal law should be applied, but ultimately found that it need not
decide the issue because no Cherokee law existed on the subject and “any tribal resolution would look, in these
circumstances, to applicable federal and North Carolina law.” 242 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001).
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regime can create.237 The case involved the non-Indian Risses, residing on off-reservation land
in South Dakota, who brought a suit in state court against the Meeks, three members of the Ogala
Sioux Tribe living on the reservation, after cattle bearing the Meeks’ brands entered the Risses’
property. The Risses alleged claims for trespass, for which they sought compensatory damages.
Based on the Meeks’ alleged failure to install a fence, the Risses also sought punitive damages
for “willful, wanton, and reckless conduct.” 238
The South Dakota Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction over the first claim, but not
the second.239 The first action, for trespass, was based on damage to the Risse’s land, which was
“undisputably not Indian Country.”240 The second cause of action, however, hinged on the
Meeks’ failure to construct a fence. Under South Dakota law, fences were a “fixture and part of
the realty,” and the claim therefore arose on Indian trust land, over which the court lacked
jurisdiction.241 In a thoughtful concurrence, Justice Konenkamp defended the result on the
ground that tribes should have the right to set standards of conduct on tribal land. The state of
South Dakota, he noted, lacked regulatory authority over “the construction and maintenance of a
fence in Indian country”; thus, “imposing punitive damages for fencing decisions on the
reservation allows the state to do indirectly what it would never do directly.”242 Instead, tribal
courts should have the ability to decide questions pertaining to “the alleged wrongful use and
possession of land located in Indian Country by a tribal Indian defendant”; to hold otherwise
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would be to violate the principle that Indians possessed the sovereign right to “make and be
governed by their own laws.”243
The force of Konenkamp’s argument, however, was entirely dependent on the view that
the Risses’ lawsuit could be seen as asserting two entirely different claims — one relating to
actions on state territory, and one concerning internal reservation matters. By contrast, the
dissenting justices viewed the trespass as a single cause of action. A dissent by Justice
Amundson244 emphasized that splitting the case would be an “odd procedure” because the
punitive damages claim “merely constitute[d] an element of recovery on the underlying cause of
action[,] . . . not an independent or additional cause of action which can be separated and stand
on its own.”245 As Amundson noted, what the court was doing in effect was not splitting claims
but splitting different sorts of evidence relating to a single claim — evidence relating to the claim
for compensatory damages in state court and evidence relating to the “punitive damage portion of
the claim” in tribal court.246 Notably, Amundson recognized that state law should not be
imposed on the tribal defendants with respect to the punitive damages claim; instead, “[t]he
conduct that may warrant punitive damages, if any, will have to be evaluated based on the rules
or laws of the place where the conduct occurs, namely tribal land.”247
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As the dissenting justices appeared to recognize, choice-of-law analysis might have
clarified the court’s analysis and simplified decision of an essentially uncomplicated case. Had
the court instead considered the option of applying Ogala Sioux law to the question of punitive
damages, it would have been able to answer Justice Konenkamp’s objection that the state should
not be in the business of imposing standards of conduct in Indian country without the need to
artificially separate the claim into two parts. In other words, Ogala Sioux standards of conduct
would continue to govern how the Meeks fenced their farm, but the plaintiffs would not have
been forced to split their cause of action between two forums.248
This case also illustrates how the rule of Williams places excessive emphasis on the form
of a lawsuit. The decision to define the Risses’ punitive damages claim as a separate cause of
action meant that the state lacked power to assert jurisdiction over it, since under Williams, state
courts are not permitted to hear suits against Indian defendants arising out of on-reservation
transactions. By contrast, if the punitive damages claim had been defined as part of the Risses’
state-law cause of action, Williams would presumably impose no barrier to allowing it to be
heard in state court. Under Risse, therefore, whether the tribe had any say in setting standards of
conduct for its members essentially hinged on a quirk of South Dakota procedure — that is,
whether South Dakota regarded a particular legal demand as constituting two claims or one.
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Even when a case does not does not present such complicated procedural conundrums,
state courts’ reluctance to apply tribal law may lead to unfair results and cause states to distort
the way in which their choice-of-law principles are normally applied. In Warm Springs Forest
Products Inds. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co.,249 the Oregon Supreme Court considered a dispute
between a non-Indian insurer and its insured, a tribal enterprise owned by the Confederated
Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon. The insurer had allegedly made oral
promises to the tribal enterprise, not reflected in the written policy, to rebate a portion of the
premium for workers’ compensation coverage. 250 Under Oregon law, a promise by an insurer to
rebate part of a workers’ compensation coverage premium was invalid unless “plainly expressed”
in the policy.251 The tribal enterprise, however, argued that the court should apply tribal law,
under which the promise was valid.
The Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon law applied. While the policy did not
contain an explicit choice-of-law provision, the court relied on two other provisions in the policy
to suggest that the parties anticipated the application of Oregon law. First, the contract provided
that changes in “classifications, or rating plans” affecting “the benefits provided by the
Workman's Compensation Law” were to be stated in an endorsement to the policy. Because
Oregon had a comprehensive law regulating insurance classifications and ratings, while Warm
Springs law did not, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that this provision could only refer to
Oregon law.252 In addition, the policy also referred to conditions under which promises to pay
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policyholder dividends were “unlawful in Oregon.”253 From the existence of these two
provisions, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Oregon law was intended to apply to the
entire contract.254
In reaching this conclusion, the court seemed to rely as much on the fact that discovering
the applicable tribal law might be burdensome as on any convincing evidence of the parties’
intentions. The tribal code provided that, in tribal court — the jurisdiction of which was limited
to controversies involving $3,000 or less — “matters that are not covered by this Code [or] the
traditional customs and usages of the Tribe . . . shall be decided by the Court according to the
laws of the State of Oregon.”255 Apparently daunted by the prospect of assessing whether any
“traditional customs and usages” of the tribe differed from Oregon law, the court concluded that
“Warm Springs is in no position to insist that the circuit court or the appellate courts must seek
out and take judicial notice of all possible sources of laws or customs of the Confederated Tribes
in order to determine whether or not these hypothetical laws or customs would enforce this
insurance contract.”256
As the dissent pointed out, 257 the court overstated the difficulties of searching out Warm
Springs law — since, presumably, the court would have had to analyze not, as the majority
intimated, the entire universe of Warm Springs contract law, but only Warm Springs law on the
subject of oral promises. Indeed, the dissent urged, to find that the provision was enforceable
under Warm Springs law, the court would only have had to investigate whether Warm Springs
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had “some law of enforceable agreements which . . . has not been specifically modified by a
statute like [the Oregon anti-rebate law].”258 More fundamentally, of course, as the dissent also
pointed out, that finding Warm Springs law on a subject might be difficult was not a sufficient
basis for concluding that the parties had not intended such law to apply.259
Notably, the majority explicitly rejected Warm Springs’s argument that Oregon’s choiceof-law principles dictated the application of tribal law. In the tribe’s view, application of Oregon
law would “ha[ve] the effect of invalidating the rebate agreement, the main reason plaintiff
bought the policy,” and should thus not be applied given that, according to the Second
Restatement, “a contractual choice to apply foreign law which is contrary to the fundamental
public policy of the place where the contract is made and performed will not be given effect.”260
Rejecting this argument, the court found that upholding the policy’s apparent choice of Oregon
law would not be “contrary to the policy expressed in the tribal code’s reference to Oregon law in
the absence of governing federal law or Indian written or customary law.”261 This is, of course,
circular logic, given that the tribal code followed Oregon law only where it did not conflict with
tribal law, and the majority had refused to undertake the examination of whether any such
contrary tribal law existed.
As Warm Springs illustrates, the unwillingness of state courts to apply tribal law can
result in paternalistic assumptions about tribal goals and decisions that fail to advance — or even
to consider — tribal interests. Instead of simply investigating what tribal law might be on what
258
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was, in this case, a fairly narrow point, the majority rejected the possibility out of hand as too
difficult.262 Further, in order to reach this conclusion, the court had to both ignore its usual
choice-of-law doctrine and adopt an aggressive — and likely incorrect — interpretation of the
evidence before it. By contrast, as the dissent pointed out, had the court simply applied its
normal contractual choice-of-law principles consistently, it would likely have had to investigate
only a narrow point of Warm Springs law. Such a result arguably would have been both simpler
and fairer.
3.

Advantages of the Choice-of-Law Approach

The preceding section has suggested some of the ways in which a choice-of-law approach
would often be fairer, more predictable, and more efficient than the current way in which most
states treat cases with tribal contacts. The advantages of a choice-of-law approach, however,
extend much more broadly. Most fundamentally, such a practice would acknowledge a growing
reality: that the extent of tribal adjudicative and regulatory jurisdiction is frequently much
narrower than the scope of what most courts would acknowledge as tribes’ legitimate interests.
For example, when nonmembers are responsible for torts whose effects are felt within a
reservation’s borders, all members of the tribe may feel that their safety and security has
decreased. The tribe, however, is likely to lack authority either to regulate the nonmember’s
behavior directly or to require the matter to be heard in tribal court. Allowing state courts to
apply tribal law in such circumstances has the potential to promote tribal autonomy and self-

261

300 Ore. at 623.
While the interests of tribes and tribal litigants are of course not always identical, there was no indication that the
interests of the tribal corporation might differ from those of the tribe.

262

69

determination by providing a way in which tribal interests can be taken into account.263
Relatedly, choice-of-law analysis has the potential to introduce a welcome element of
territoriality into state courts’ approach to claims arising on Indian reservations. As the Supreme
Court’s understanding of tribal legislative authority has increasingly focused on tribal
membership rather than on the boundaries of reservations or of Indian country, 264 tribes’ ability
to influence events that occur within their borders has been severely weakened. Yet borders and
a sense of place remain central to the way most people conceive of sovereign nationhood, and
decisions based on territory foster a greater sense of certainty and predictability.265 Applying a
choice-of-law approach that contains a territorial component would heighten the significance of
whether or not an event occurs within “Indian country,” and thus allow tribal sovereignty to have
a surer geographical reach.
More symbolically, state-court use of choice-of-law principles in the tribal context would
be a gesture of comity, allowing state courts to treat tribal law in the same manner they do the
law of other coequal sovereigns. Such a gesture of respect could help build more trust between
state and tribal courts, facilitating cooperation in other areas where state-tribal jurisdictional
overlap exists — such as the management of parallel state and tribal proceedings or the
enforcement of tribal orders in state court.
Other advantages of applying tribal law are more practical. Choice-of-law methodologies
generally allow courts some flexibility to consider the facts of the case in an individualized way,
a quality particularly helpful in sorting out the tangled mixture of state and tribal contacts that
263
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often characterizes state-court cases involving Indians. Applying choice-of-law principles, a
court could, for example, decide that, of the plaintiff’s several related claims, some should be
governed by state law and some by tribal law. By contrast, under a scheme that assumes each
forum will apply its own law, a plaintiff whose case involves both state and reservation contacts
is compelled to split his case between state and tribal court if she wants tribal law to apply to any
of her claims.
Further, because the choice of which law to apply is not a question of jurisdiction, it can
be made in combination with a determination of the merits of the case. By contrast, if
jurisdiction is uncertain, the court will often be forced to engage in an extensive, fact-specific
inquiry before it has even established that it has the power to hear the case. In particular, a
choice-of-law approach that looks to the number and quality of contacts between a defendant and
the tribe simply has more inherent flexibility than a forum-centered approach, allowing courts to
consider often-complex issues (such as the degree of affiliation between a given litigant and a
tribe) in a more precise, case-by-case manner.
Encouraging state courts to apply tribal law in situations like the ones described has the
potential to create more consistent results and reduce the possibilities for forum-shopping. Under
a solely forum-based approach, whether state law or tribal law applies to a case may be dictated
by who sues whom first, and therefore whether the case is assigned to state or tribal court. Under
a choice-of-law approach, however, which law applies is determined by factors such as the place
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of relevant events and the domicile of the litigants266 that remain constant regardless of the
configuration of the lawsuit.
Finally, an advantage of interest analysis and Second Restatement-type approaches in
particular would be to allow courts to separate the interest of tribal litigants from the interest of
the tribe itself, and to allow both to be accorded their proper weight. Under the current, forumbased approach, that is, the Supreme Court has rarely considered whether the tribe as a whole
might have a stake in a given case that differs from that of the individual litigants. In Fisher, for
example, the Court concluded that, because tribal adjudication of cases involving internal tribal
matters would strengthen tribal independence, it was also in the best interests of individual
Indian plaintiffs. In Wold I and II, the Court took this equation in the other direction, assuming
that what was in the best interest of Indian litigants — ready access to state courts — was also in
the best interest of tribes.
Of course, in many cases, there may be little difference in practice between tribal and
litigant interests. For example, cases involving tribal contacts that appear in state court often
involve tribal corporations that are closely linked to the tribal government. Nonetheless, it is
possible to imagine cases where litigant and tribal interests might diverge. A given Indian
litigant, for example, might prefer state law because it is more favorable in a certain situation,
while the tribe might favor a tribal ordinance intended to repair relationships between Indian
litigants.
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Under current procedure, the interests of Indian litigants will be by default given greater
weight than the interests of the tribe simply because litigants generally have more control over
which court hears the case. Where concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction exists, for example,
Indian plaintiffs have a choice about where to sue; while defendants have less obvious control,
they may be able to shape the litigation in subtler ways — for example, by deciding whether or
not to press Williams v. Lee objections when a case against them is brought in state court.
Choice-of-law approaches that allow for some consideration of governmental interests would
help to redress this balance by allowing the tribe’s interests to be taken into account as well.
In certain circumstances, application of tribal law could benefit state courts as well as
tribes. A rule like “law of the place” is simple to apply, and state courts might prefer navigating
basic choice-of-law principles to negotiating the complicated jurisdictional patchwork of
Montana. A state court, therefore, might choose to treat a tribe exactly as it does a sister state for
choice-of-law purposes in order to foster ease of administration and predictable results. Further,
while states and tribes have historically competed for authority over Indian country, the judicial
branches of both sovereigns have been moving steadily toward greater cooperation. Many state
and tribal courts now enjoy friendly relations.267 State courts might, therefore, make the comitybased decision to treat tribes as ordinary sovereigns for choice-of-law purposes in order to help
foster the mutually beneficial relationships many state and tribal courts have cultivated.
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III.

Answering Objections to the Application of Tribal Law in State Court
Despite the apparent advantages described above, many state courts have been reluctant

to apply tribal law under choice-of-law principles, and some Indian-law scholars have spoken
against the practice. This Part considers the arguments, both doctrinal and policy-based, that
courts and commentators have made against the application of tribal law in state courts. The first
section focuses on fairness to nonmembers, considering whether the application of tribal law in
state court might be limited by constitutional restrictions or principles of federal Indian law that
limit tribal sovereignty. The second section focuses on whether state-court application of tribal
law is in tension with Supreme Court cases protecting tribal autonomy. Finally, the third section
considers more broadly whether state-court application of tribal law should be discouraged
because it is impractical or not in tribes’ best interests.
A.

States’ Authority to Apply Tribal Law To Nonmembers of the Tribe
The first question that must be addressed about the extent of states’ authority to apply

tribal law is whether tribal law may validly be applied to nonmembers. After all, in the ordinary
course of events, litigants who are not members of a tribe cannot be made defendants in tribal
court; further, in most cases, the tribe cannot regulate their conduct. In light of these facts, do
Supreme Court precedents permit tribal law to be applied to nonmembers at all?
In that respect, it is important to note that decisions about whether and how to apply tribal
law in state court are, in the first instance, questions of state law. Modern courts and
commentators have definitively rejected the beliefs of Beale and other early choice-of-law
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theorists that a right is “created” when a cause of action becomes complete.268 A state court’s
decision to apply state law, therefore, chooses to do so by its own inherent authority, not the
tribe’s. Thus, in the absence of any preempting federal dictate, states should be free to apply
tribal law if they choose to do so.
Further, the Supreme Court has held that a state court’s power to apply any particular
state’s law to the dispute before it is restricted only by the modest limits imposed by the Due
Process Clause. In the key case on the subject, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 269 a woman whose
husband had been killed in a motorcycle accident sued in Minnesota court seeking a declaration
that her late husband’s insurance policies could be “stacked” pursuant to Minnesota law; the
insurer argued that Wisconsin law should govern the question.270 Although the insurance policy
had been delivered in Wisconsin, the accident had occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons
involved in the accident were Wisconsin residents when it occurred, the Minnesota Supreme
Court nonetheless determined that Minnesota law should apply.271
The Supreme Court upheld this decision, finding that the Minnesota courts’ decision
satisfied the basic test the Due Process clause imposed on state choice-of-law decisions — that
the choice be “neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”272 This test, the Court indicated,
would be satisfied if the state whose law was applied had any “significant … aggregation of
268
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contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.” As applied
in Hague, this requirement did not prove to be an onerous one. As the Court noted, Hague had
just three contacts in Minnesota; he worked in Minnesota273; Allstate did business in
California274; and Hague’s widow had married a Minnesota resident and moved to Minnesota
prior to filing the lawsuit.275 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that this slim collection of
contacts — none of which was directly related to the accident, and one of which arose well after
the events at issue — was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. The Court further
observed that states have wide scope to choose which choice-of-law system to apply, noting that
“a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in
constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”276
While Hague concerned a forum’s attempts to apply its own law, the Court gave no
indication that its holding was limited to application of forum law. Thus, presumably Hague also
sets the constitutional boundaries for state-court application of tribal law. Hague would thus
appear to indicate that, so long as a litigant has contacts with the tribe or his actions have some
effect on it, there should be no constitutional obstacle to the application of tribal law.
One objection to this analysis might be that, because of the more limited nature of tribal
sovereignty, a higher constitutional threshold exists for the application of tribal law. The Court
has, for example, weighed concerns of procedural fairness in determining the extent of tribes’
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adjudicative jurisdiction.277 Thus, it is possible that the application of tribal law to nonmembers
might raise special due process concerns.
Yet while it is certainly true that the Supreme Court has not treated tribes identically to
states or other sovereigns, the Court has given no indication that this distinction is relevant for
choice-of-law purposes; indeed, the Court has occasionally suggested situations in which the
application of tribal law might be appropriate.278 In matters involving the law of foreign nations,
states have generally dealt with conflicts of law in the manner that their usual policies dictate,
notwithstanding the fact that such choices may have broader implications for foreign relations or
other federal policies.279 Thus, even where some federal interest may be present, choice-of-law
decisions have normally been treated as an internal state matter, one with which federal courts
have not attempted to interfere as long as basic due process requirements are met. The same
result, therefore, should also apply in the tribal context. Indeed, this is the result courts appear to
have reached in practice; courts that have considered the peculiar attributes of tribal sovereignty
in deciding whether to apply tribal law have ultimately concluded that tribes should be treated in
the same manner as other sovereigns.280
Although application of tribal law by state courts thus seems unlikely to raise
constitutional questions in the vast majority of cases, the question of whether state choice-of-law
decisions might ever be preempted by federal Indian-law principles is a more uncertain one. The
Supreme Court has never explicitly discussed the relationship between choice-of-law theory,
277
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with its territorial emphasis, and the more uncertain boundaries of tribal jurisdiction sketched by
Montana. As detailed in the preceding discussion, the Court has generally — though not
universally — assumed that state courts will apply state law, even as it has at other points
suggested that state courts might choose to apply tribal law, or even be required to do so.
Therefore, even though the way in which state courts resolve conflicts between the law of other
jurisdictions is ordinarily a matter of state law, principles of federal Indian law might dictate
different results where tribal law is concerned. In other words, the Court’s statements in
Montana and successor cases about federal limitations on tribal sovereignty might preempt a
state court’s decision to treat a tribe on an equal footing with other sovereigns.281 Under
Montana, therefore, state courts might be forbidden from applying tribal law at all — or, at a
minimum, from applying it to disputes that the tribe would not have authority to regulate directly.
Such a conclusion, while tempting, would be incorrect. Strate and Hicks, read carefully,
do not explicitly provide that state law must apply, or that tribal law may not apply, to
nonmembers whose conduct has an effect on the well-being of tribes. It is clear from Montana
that tribes may not tax or regulate nonmembers’ use of their private land except in special
circumstances, and it is clear from Strate that a tort claim against a nonmember may not be
brought in tribal court, at least if the tort did not occur on tribal trust land. But the Supreme
Court has never held that, for example, a tribal code provision imposing liability for negligent
conduct on the reservation should have no relevance of any kind to nonmembers. On the
contrary, the Court has recognized that tribes have some stake in the conduct going on within
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their borders, even as it has held that this interest is generally outweighed by nonmembers’
interest in not being subject to the authority of tribal courts.282
Even in the handful of states on which Congress has conferred jurisdiction over Indian
country pursuant to P.L. 280, a case can be made that no direct federal barrier exists to the
application of tribal law, at least in certain circumstances, to tribal disputes brought in state court.
This is true notwithstanding the fact that Bryan v. Itasca County,283 a case that rose from the
aftermath of 1950s assimilationist politics, provides arguable support for the principle that state
courts hearing tribal disputes should, at least in P.L. 280 states, apply state law. In Bryan, the
Court considered the scope of civil jurisdiction over Indian country in states that were included in
P.L. 280. While Congress’s primary concern in enacting P.L. 280 had been to give states a role
in punishing criminal conduct on reservations, the statute also included hastily drafted civil
jurisdiction provisions.284 These provided that the participating states “shall have jurisdiction
over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the
areas of Indian country listed . . . to the same extent that such State . . . has jurisdiction over other
civil causes of action,” and further that the “civil laws of such State . . . that are of general
application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State.”285 Taking the position that this
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provision authorized the application of state law within Indian country,286 Minnesota sought to
collect personal property tax from a Chippewa Tribe member living on the reservation.287 The
Bryan Court held that the state lacked authority to do so. In what is generally hailed as an
important victory for tribal independence, the Supreme Court narrowly construed P.L. 280’s
somewhat cryptic civil jurisdiction provisions, holding that the jurisdiction granted states was
solely adjudicatory and did not permit tribes to be “subordinated to the full panoply of state
regulatory powers.”288 Instead, the Court found, the purpose of the civil-jurisdiction provisions
was simply to “redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes
between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens, by permitting the
courts of the States to decide such disputes.”289

.

Bryan’s central holding enabled tribes to preserve a core of distinct regulatory authority
even in P.L. 280 states, and has rightfully been hailed as a masterly decision by a Court that
wished to avoid giving states wholesale authorization to regulate events within Indian country
while at the same time interpreting P.L. 280 in a way that its text could plausibly support. 290
Bryan’s more problematic aspect, however, is its assumption that state law would apply to statecourt proceedings involving Indians in P.L. 280 states. Although the Court did not specifically
286

The extent to which states can tax transactions by tribe members or otherwise regulate conduct within Indian
country is a complex issue in its own right. In general, states do not lack all authority to regulate in Indian country,
but their powers are sharply limited. States generally do not have power to tax on-reservation activity or to regulate
the use of tribal lands, although they may have such authority over nonmembers on fee lands within a reservation.
See Canby, supra note 17, at 270-76. In P.L. 280 states, state “prohibitory” state law may apply in Indian country,
but state “regulatory” law generally does not. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,
210 (1987).
287
426 U.S. at 375.
288
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 (1976).
289
Id. at 384.
290
See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in
Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 430-432 (1993) (describing the Court’s “artful” construction of “one of
the most assimilationist laws in American history”).

80

discuss the issue, most commentators have assumed that, under Bryan, state law can and should
apply to disputes brought pursuant to P.L. 280.291
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret Bryan as setting forth a more general
principle that state law should apply to tribal matters in state court. It is first important to note
that the Bryan court was dealing with a specific piece of legislation, one that does not apply in
many states, such as New Mexico, with a large number of tribal disputes. Because of the
sweeping language of P.L. 280, it is hard to see how the Court could have interpreted P.L. 280
any more narrowly than it did. P.L. 280 plainly gives state law, under some circumstances, the
same “force and effect within . . . Indian country” as it has in the state at large; by limiting the
such laws’ “force and effect” to the adjudicative context, the Court ensured that state law would
not be generally applicable to tribes — and further that it would apply only when tribal litigants,
by bringing cases to state court, affirmatively elected it. Ultimately, therefore, far from
establishing a broad mandate for the application of state law by state courts, the Court ensured
that P.L. 280’s commands would have the narrowest possible effect.
Given this, it is possible to interpret Bryan to allow the application of tribal law under
limited circumstances to tribal disputes even in P.L. 280 states. Under Bryan, P.L. 280 could be
interpreted to allow states to apply their “whole law”— that is, in choice-of-law terminology,
their choice-of-law principles as well as their substantive law.292 If states applied their usual

291

Canby, supra note 17, at 226. See also Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 208 (suggesting that, under P.L. 280, state
law would apply in “private civil litigation”). Note that even when plaintiffs assert state causes of action, courts in
P.L. 280 states may be required to engage issues of tribal law. See, e.g., Turner v. Martire, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1042,
1054-55 (2000) (finding that plaintiffs could assert state-law tort claims against tribal officials against whom plaintiff
had asserted state-law tort claims were not immune because they had not shown that they were acting within the
scope of their official duties under tribal law).
292
See Pearson, supra note 4, at 725 (arguing that, in some cases, courts directed to apply a state’s “whole law” might
ultimately apply tribal law as a result of that state’s choice-of-law principles).

81

choice-of-law principles to P.L. 280 actions, such principles could ultimately dictate the
application of tribal law to the given action. Though Congress may not have explicitly foreseen
this result, it is difficult to argue that P.L. 280 expressly forbids it, since state choice-of-law
principles are as much laws of “general application” as tort or contract law.293 Because Bryan
reaffirms tribes’ continuing regulatory jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country, there is a
particularly strong case that application of tribal law in P.L. 280 states is permissible when such
law is applied to govern events and transactions that the tribe would have authority to regulate, or
to contracts in which the application of tribal law is a negotiated term.294 Thus, even when a case
is brought pursuant to P.L. 280 jurisdiction, the possibility of applying tribal law may not be
entirely foreclosed.
B.

Application of Tribal Law and Federal Principles of Tribal Autonomy
While the Montana line of cases has been aimed at shielding nonmembers from unwanted

assertions of tribal jurisdiction, Supreme Court case law has also had another, arguably more
important goal: protecting the rights of tribes against states. Thus, as Williams and Fisher
indicate, some matters implicating tribes are simply inappropriate for adjudication in state court.
Could the same be true, under any circumstances, with regard to state-court decisions to apply
tribal law? In other words, is it possible that the application of tribal law might, in some cases,
be preempted under federal Indian law on the grounds that it conflicts with tribal sovereignty?
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As a preliminary matter, it bears noting that the application of state law to events that
concern tribe members or that take place on reservation always interferes, to a greater or lesser
extent, with both of Williams’s imperatives — that is, that tribes be permitted both to “make”
their own laws and to “be ruled by” them. Because the court’s decision becomes a binding state
precedent in which the tribe has no say, the process of adjudication interferes with tribes’ ability
to “make” their own laws. Moreover, when state law is applied to reservation matters, it also
interferes with tribes’ ability to “be ruled by” the laws they make, because a sovereign other than
the tribe determines the law to which tribe members will be subject.
The equation becomes more complicated, however, when a dispute is heard in state court,
but tribal law applies. It is certainly true that, in some cases, the application of tribal law by a
state rather than a tribal court has the potential to undermine the principles announced in
Williams. Where a given tribe’s judicial values are fundamentally incompatible with state-court
adjudication — as may be the case, for example, with tribes using nonadversarial dispute
resolution processes — allowing a state court to hear a case may inevitably distort and dilute
tribal law, interfering with tribes’ right to make law in the manner they might wish. Similarly,
where a tribal forum is available but a case is brought in state court, the effect of allowing the
state court to apply tribal law may be to undermine the tribal court’s authority. In such situations,
allowing a state rather than a tribal court to apply tribal law is certainly in tension, if not outright
conflict, with the underlying principles of Williams.
This line of reasoning, however, rests on the broad assumption that a tribal forum is both
available and a viable alternative to state court. As has been discussed, however, many cases
exist in which a tribe has legitimate interests in the outcome of a case, but a state court is, for
83

jurisdictional or practical reasons, the only forum in which the dispute can be heard. In such
cases, application of tribal law in state court promotes tribes’ right to “be ruled by” the laws they
make, by allowing tribes to expand their sphere of influence and ensure that tribal standards of
conduct are applied to events that might affect them. In other words, where a tribal forum is not
readily available, the application of tribal law should not be seen as usurping the role of the tribal
court, but instead as displacing state law that would otherwise apply. Because application of
state law to tribal matters rarely furthers tribal self-rule, application of tribal law in such
circumstances is in keeping with Williams’s broad principles.
Thus, a more productive way of looking at Williams may be as a case that is relevant to
decisions about which law should apply to a case rather than exclusively to decisions about
which forum should hear it. That is, once state-court jurisdiction is already established, either
because the Supreme Court has mandated it or an Indian litigant has chosen it, the reasoning of
Williams v. Lee should weigh in favor of, not against, the application of tribal law.295 Such an
interpretation would address Williams’s key concerns — ensuring that tribal law is applied to
tribal matters and that Indian defendants are not required to appear in state court against their
will. Yet it would also acknowledge the reality that many cases with tribal contacts are heard by
state courts, and that the tribe has a continuing state in those cases.
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A subtler problem in applying tribal law in state court involves the implication of
precedents that the Court has developed in the federal-court context. As the previous section has
discussed, the Court has generally assumed that state and tribal courts operate in separate spheres
and will apply separate law — while also acknowledging that, under certain circumstances, state
and tribal courts might have concurrent jurisdiction over the same case. The Court has given
state courts little guidance in how to negotiate areas of overlapping jurisdiction with tribal courts
— what to do, for example, if a litigant files suit in tribal court and then proceeds to file another
suit, arising out of the same facts, in state court.296
Nonetheless, in cases where the jurisdiction of tribal and federal court arguably overlaps,
the Court has held that, where arguable tribal-court jurisdiction exists, a plaintiff can sue in state
court only after pursuing tribal remedies, including any possible appeals. Although the extent of
tribal jurisdiction is a question of federal law, the Court held in National Farmers Union v. Crow
Tribe297 that tribal courts must have the opportunity to determine their own jurisdiction first; only
after a final pronouncement from the tribal courts may federal courts engage in a final level of
review to determine whether the tribal exercise of jurisdiction was proper.298
In Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,299 the Court clarified that the exhaustion principle
extended even to cases in which federal jurisdiction was founded in diversity. In such cases, the
court found, “unconditional access to the federal forum would place it in direct competition with
the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority over reservation affairs.”300 Further, the
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Court observed, “[a]djudication of such matters by any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal
lawmaking authority, because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.”301
Various state court cases have considered the implications of Crow Tribe and LaPlante
for concurrent state/tribal jurisdiction.302 State courts have differed on whether Crow Tribe and
LaPlante require state court abstention where states and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over a
case.303 On the one hand, LaPlante makes clear that tribal courts are to be the primary
expositors of tribal law, and that adjudication by nontribal courts to some extent always impinges
on tribal sovereignty. On the other hand, LaPlante does not speak at all to the issue of state
jurisdiction, and other Supreme Court cases, from Bryan to Wold, contemplate the exercise of
concurrent state jurisdiction under certain circumstances without articulating an equivalent
exhaustion principle.
In considering the issue, it is important to note, first, that Crow Tribe and LaPlante both
dealt a situation in which a suit was already pending in tribal court and the tribal court’s
jurisdiction was thus directly challenged. Although the holding of these cases was not limited to
that situation, some courts have concluded that comity-based concerns about interference with
another sovereign’s proceedings are less compelling when no tribal suit has yet been filed —
even in situations where the tribal court might hypothetically have jurisdiction over the case.304
In such cases, that is, state-court adjudication might indirectly undermine the power of tribal
courts to pronounce on reservation affairs, but it does not operate as a direct attempt to strip the
301
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tribal court of its authority. While the underlying principles of LaPlante counsel caution in any
case where concurrent tribal jurisdiction exists, an argument can be made that a state court
should, in limited circumstances, have discretion to hear such cases — if, for example, the state
forum is strongly preferred by an Indian plaintiff.
An even stronger argument can be made that a case in which a state court has exclusive
jurisdiction should be regarded differently from one in which it is exercising concurrent
jurisdiction — and thus potentially competing with tribal courts. Indeed, if a tribal court is not
available or clearly lacks jurisdiction over a case, the exhaustion principle of Crow Tribe and
LaPlante cannot apply literally — since there is, in effect, nothing to exhaust. In this regard, it is
worth noting that the Supreme Court has retreated from much of the reasoning on which
LaPlante rested.305 The Supreme Court’s recent case law has not only narrowed the scope of
tribal jurisdiction, but ensured that tribal and state jurisdiction will remain closely linked in a way
that tribal and federal jurisdiction are not. As Strate and Hicks make clear, state courts have a
role to play in adjudicating tribal disputes, picking up where tribal jurisdiction ends to provide a
forum in which tribe members’ claims against nonmembers can be heard.306
As the Court has limited tribal courts’ power to adjudicate cases involving nonmembers,
it has become virtually inevitable that many cases with substantial tribal contacts will be heard in
state court. Thus, the main objective of LaPlante — to ensure that tribal courts have the primary
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role in interpreting tribal law — is no longer achievable except at the cost of expanding state
law’s applicability to tribal matters.307
The aim of this discussion is not, of course, to argue that, simply because the Supreme
Court has retreated from its high point in protecting tribal sovereignty, state courts should
heedlessly decide questions of tribal law without regard to the impact of such a practice on tribes.
But as the preceding sections have described, attempts to honor the underlying principles of
LaPlante308 must take into account the reality that, in many cases, tribal law must be applied in
state court or not at all. Therefore, while LaPlante remains an important guidepost for state
courts addressing tribal-law issues, it should not operate to bar entirely state court consideration
of tribal law.
C.

Tribal Law and Tribal Interests
That Supreme Court precedent does not broadly prohibit the application of tribal law by

state courts does not, of course, mean that such a practice is always in the best interests of tribes.
Many tribes and advocates for tribal rights have been skeptical about application of tribal law
outside tribal forums and uneasy about the capacity of outsider courts to understand Indian
cultural norms. Indeed, some commentators have argued that application of tribal law outside
307
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tribal courts poses such grave threats to tribal sovereignty and practical problems of proof that
state courts should follow a “bright-line rule” of dismissing cases whenever their choice-of-law
principles point toward tribal substantive law.309
There are legitimate reasons for skepticism about the value to tribes of having their law
applied in state courts. Commentators have worried, first, that state-court adjudication of tribal
disputes will weaken the power of tribal courts. Maintaining a distinctively Indian judiciary is
important because it allows a tribe’s traditional methods of decision-making to survive. Some
tribal court systems, such as that of the Cherokee Nation, may be centuries old; such courts are
generally an integral part of tribal life.310 Even if the tribe adopts some Anglo traditions or
procedures,311 tribal court is a place where the tribe asserts its sovereignty by making and
enforcing its laws and customs. State-court application of tribal law may interfere with all these
benefits by undermining the work of tribal courts. Further, tribal and state courts are to some
extent in competition for litigants and resources. If state courts are permitted to apply tribal law,
such courts may become even more attractive alternatives, luring some plaintiffs away from
tribal court.

jurisdiction was “not similarly restricted.” Id. at 15.
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State courts can also hinder the work of tribal judiciaries in a more basic way — by
failing to get the law right, or by failing to understand the cultural and procedural background
that may be integral to the law’s application. Such concerns are particularly acute because statecourt interpretations of tribal law are unlikely to be subject to any further level of review.312
Sometimes state courts may be overwhelmed by the sheer unfamiliarity of tribal law,313 but
judges may be also become confused when state and tribal laws superficially resemble each
other. Judith Royster, for example, has noted that the frequently used tribal tort standard of
“carelessness” is subtly different from the state-law standard of “negligence,” and that nontribal
courts may blur the distinction.314 Because of the potential for this sort of misunderstanding,
both Indians and non-Indians affected by tribal-law issues may prefer to have tribal law applied
by a judge who knows it well.
While these dangers are real, however, they fail to tell the whole story. To begin with, as
commercially significant off-reservation dealings by tribes and individual Indians become
increasingly routine, some growth in the proportion of cases implicating tribal interests heard in
state court is inevitable.315 In fact, under some circumstances, cases against non-Indians are
funneled to state courts by tribal design; some tribal codes do not provide for jurisdiction over
non-Indians who do not consent to have disputes litigated there, meaning that Indian plaintiffs
who wish to sue non-Indians must go to state court.316 The problem may be even worse in P.L.
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280 states, since one effect of P.L. 280 has been to impede the development of tribal judicial
systems in affected states.317 Tribal litigants in P.L. 280 states may therefore find that no tribal
forum is available to hear their case.318 Where state courts essentially have exclusive jurisdiction
by default, concerns about competition with tribal courts are largely inapplicable.
In such circumstances, state-court application of tribal law can allow tribes to have some
voice in a wider array of cases. As Laurie Reynolds has argued in a thoughtful article, a principle
that “state courts may freely ignore tribal interests in any dispute displaying off-reservation
contacts” will hardly work to the advantage of either tribes or tribal courts.319 As the sphere in
which tribes can directly assert power over nonmembers has diminished, some tribes have come
to reject the absolutist ideal of sovereign autonomy — what Robert Laurence has wryly described
as “the increasingly unfettered power to do less and less.”320 For some tribes, that is, the
exclusive right to have tribal laws interpreted in tribal court may be less important than the
ability to exert influence over transactions that affect tribal lands and communities — a goal that
may be best accomplished by allowing state and federal courts to apply tribal law.
In addition to such lesser-of-two-evils rationales for applying tribal law, there may be
more affirmative benefits to tribes. Application of tribal law may foster a greater sense of
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cooperation between tribal and state courts, permitting state courts a basic understanding of tribal
procedures that may help reduce suspicion and miscommunication when the state court is asked
to grant full faith and credit to tribal judgments or stay its proceedings in favor of a related suit in
tribal court. Such cooperation is likely to become increasingly important as tribes’ economic
well-being comes more and more to depend on finding fair and efficient ways exist to resolve
cases that span reservation boundaries. When multimillion-dollar disputes arise between tribal
corporations and their contracting partners — as is increasingly likely in the age of tribal gaming
— both parties’ interests are served when the judicial system as a whole is able to minimize
opportunities for forum-shopping and inconsistent results.321
Where states and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction, the absence of well-defined rules
and procedures for managing interjurisdictional conflicts encourages litigants to forum shop
aggressively and creates the potential for procedural quagmires.322 State and tribal courts may,
for example, compete to be the first to reach judgments. Litigants who suspect that tribal
proceedings will fail to go their way may choose to ignore them in hopes that their
321
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nonparticipation will cast doubt on the proceedings’ legitimacy.323 When jurisdiction is available
in two courts with sharply different cultural and legal perspectives, forum choice may be entirely
determinative of the outcome, heightening incentives for procedural maneuvering and casting
doubt on the legitimacy of both courts’ proceedings.324 In such cases, encouraging state courts to
apply tribal law in appropriate circumstances fulfills a classic function of choice-of-law doctrine
— avoiding a situation in which a plaintiff’s choice of court determines a case’s outcome.
Further, heightened awareness of the differences between tribal and state law has the potential
help state courts head off certain forum-conflict problems from the start — by, for example,
alerting them to the need to stay a state case in favor of tribal proceedings when it is clear that the
case involves complex tribal-law issues.
It is also important to note that it is far from impossible for state courts to apply tribal law
carefully and accurately. Although certain elements of tribal law may be as arcane and complex
as state courts have sometimes feared, most disputes that find their way into state court do not
involve complicated matters of internal tribal relations; rather, they implicate narrow principles
of tribal tort and commercial law. In such cases, while the applicable tribal law may not mirror
exactly the law of any given state, it is likely to present the sort of conflicts with which state
courts are familiar — issues such as whether punitive damages are available,325 whether a
judicial process must precede repossession of property,326 or whether an oral contract
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modification is enforceable.327 Moreover, even when the legal issues involved are less
straightforward, finding and establishing the content of tribal law in state court need not be
complicated. State reforms in recent years have made establishing the content of foreign law
easier in general — by, for example, allowing courts to take judicial notice of such law rather
than requiring it to be proven.328 In addition, the court systems of many larger tribes are
increasingly well-financed and well-established, often with extensive, Web-searchable libraries
of decisions or equivalent resources.329
Further, the legitimate concerns about application of tribal law in state court might be
better addressed by developing strategies to funnel certain cases and issues into tribal court,
rather than banning state-court application of tribal law entirely. State courts can, for example,
give tribal courts preference in deciding tribal disputes, while remaining willing to apply tribal
law where the tribal court is inconvenient or unavailable. Courts can also develop procedural
mechanisms to facilitate consideration of tribal-law issues in state court while insuring that states
do not infringe on tribal autonomy. For example, many commentators have advocated increased
use of certification procedures for tribal-law questions.330 A few tribes already have enacted laws
permitting state and federal judges to certify questions to their courts,331 and some nontribal
327
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courts have entertained plaintiffs’ requests to certify issues of tribal law to tribal courts.332 In the
tribal law setting, certification presents an ideal opportunity for state courts to become familiar
with tribal decision-making processes in a neutral, mutually respectful context. The use of
certification procedures allows tribes to enjoy the wider authority that would come from
application of their law in state courts, without denying them the sovereign prerogative to issue
final pronouncements on their law’s content. Certification would be particularly useful in
situations where tribal substantive law is closely intertwined with procedure; in such cases, tribes
could preserve the integrity of traditional decision-making processes while retaining influence in
the outcome of state-court cases.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens or other discretionary abstention doctrines may
also be useful for achieving similar ends in cases where a tribal forum is available to hear a case
initially brought in state court.333 A finding of forum non conveniens allows a court to
discretionarily dismiss a case when the forum of a different jurisdiction is better situated — for
both practical and cultural reasons — to hear it. In international contexts, courts consider several
central factors in deciding whether to dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conveniens,
including both issues “pertaining to the private interests of the litigants,” such as ease of access to
sources of proof, the cost of obtaining witnesses, and other practical issues, and “public factors”
such as the interest in “having localized controversies decided at home” and the avoidance of
“the application of foreign law.”334 Many of these factors will often be present in the Indian-law
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context as well, since the state court may be distant geographically from tribal occurrences and
may be wholly unfamiliar with tribal law, while parties may find it difficult to bring witnesses to
a sometimes-distant state court.
Because forum non conveniens allows courts to consider a variety of factors particular to
the individual case, it provides a great deal of flexibility to individual judges. Further, since
forum non conveniens determinations are often made contingent on the availability of an
alternative forum,335 the doctrine also allows state courts to permit tribal courts a first chance to
consider difficult issues of tribal law while retaining the prerogative to hear the case if no tribal
forum proves to be available.
Finally, the choice-of-law process itself affords opportunities for states to take tribal
interests into consideration. Tribes that value internal decision-making procedures, fear
competition from state courts, or worry about distortion of tribal law in the hands of outsiders
can adopt a formal policy opposing state-court application of their law. Tribes could also, of
course, sanction the application of certain areas of tribal law (commercial law, for example) by
state courts, while specifying that other aspects of tribal law (such as those touching on family
relations) are matters of internal tribal relations to be decided by the tribe alone. Because most
choice-of-law regimes allow state courts to take public-policy issues into account when deciding
which sovereign’s law to apply,336 state courts would be able to consider the preferences of tribes
when deciding whether or not to apply tribal law. State courts would also have an additional
incentive to avoid the application of tribal law when it is contrary to the tribe’s preference, since
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there is a greater danger that such a practice would violate the tribe’s right to “make [its] own
laws and to be ruled by them” and hence run afoul of the central principle of Williams.
As a last note, any argument that state application of tribal law will lead to conflict or
misunderstanding must grapple with the fact that many state courts have already committed
themselves to a process of interpreting tribal law in an area in which issues of cross-cultural
understanding are likely to prove far more problematic. This statement refers, of course, to many
state courts’ refusal to give automatic full faith and credit to tribal judgments.337 Procedures in
the majority of states dictate that state courts must examine tribal judgments for fairness and
procedural regularity before making a decision whether to enforce them. To take a representative
statute, Wisconsin allows state courts to examine tribal judgments based on a number of criteria,
including whether they were “procured in compliance with procedures required by the rendering
court.” 338
Ironically, such requirements often require state courts to examine tribal law far more
extensively than would be necessary if they were to apply directly a substantive point of tribal
law. State courts deciding whether to enforce tribal orders must often undertake a detailed
examination of tribal-court procedures as well as tribal-law substance. Suppose, for example,
that the party resisting enforcement of a tribal judgment contends that the tribal judge violated
standards of due process by applying a tribal ordinance inconsistently in his case.339 In order to
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assess the validity of that claim, the court must have at least a general understanding of the
content of that ordinance and the procedures by which it is normally applied. The court must
also be able to review the tribal proceedings in the individual case to determine whether the tribal
court applied those procedures in a fashion inconsistent with usual practice. Making such
determinations on a reasonably principled basis, therefore, may require the court to immerse
itself thoroughly in the details of tribal law. Further, many orders that tribal litigants seek to
enforce beyond reservation borders concern time-sensitive, sometimes emotionally charged
issues, such as restraining orders in domestic violence cases and child custody determinations.340
Such background realities are, of course, unlikely to make the job of state courts any easier.
By contrast, where state conflict-of-law principles dictate the application of tribal law, the
issues are likely to be less complex. 341 By definition, tribal issues that appear in state court
virtually always involve a mix of on-reservation and off-reservation contacts. Where tribal law
on the subject exists, therefore, it is often law that the tribe has enacted in the knowledge that it
may be applied to dealings with nonmembers. For that very reason, it may more closely tailored
to off-reservation situations and more easily translated into Anglo norms. It is notable that most
of the cases discussed in this Article do not involve fundamental cultural clashes, but more
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mundane and familiar matters: whether punitive damages are allowed or limited, the judicial
process required before property can be repossessed, and so on. Relative to the complicated
procedural matters that state courts often encounter in the full faith and credit context, these
issues are likely to be relatively straightforward.
Conclusion
A place exists for tribal law in state courts. Even allowing for the unusual features of
tribal sovereignty, state choice-of-law principles, applied neutrally and consistently, should
frequently point to tribal law as the decisional law in many cases. The Supreme Court’s decision
to treat the problem of cases with mixed state and tribal contacts as solely a question of
jurisdiction and forum choice has obscured the potential a choice-of-law approach offers to
advance the interests of tribes and resolve the procedural dilemmas of litigants. As long as
proper safeguards are in place, state courts should be encouraged to analyze cases involving tribal
contacts in choice-of-law terms.
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